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OBSCENITY LAW AND THE JUSTICES:
REVERSING POLICY
ON THE SUPREME COURT
Rodney A. Grunes*
The Supreme Court has been substantially involved with obscenity
law since its first major pronouncement on the issue in 1957. From that
time to the present, Supreme Court decision-making in this area has been
marked by a great degree of internal disagreement. For the most part,
neither the. Warren nor the Burger Courts have been able to marshal
majority support for a single definition of obscenity. Yet a shift in attitude
has been evident. The permissive policy adopted by the Warren Court has
been replaced by the more restrictive approach of the Burger Court.
Maintaining that in no other policy area has such a significant reversal of
policy taken place, Mr. Grunes in this article examines the process of this
change. An important reason for this reversal, Mr. Grunes argues, was
the failure of the justices during the Warren Court era to agree upon a
single definition of obscenity. The author identifies no less than six positions that existed at that time on the obscenity issue and attempts to demonstrate that this internal disagreement within the Warren Court over a
definition of obscenity created conditions conducive to change. Focusing
then on the Burger Court, Mr. Grunes identifies three major states of
policy reformulation: curtailment of Warren Court policy with respect to
its permissive approach to obscenity, reversal of that policy, and the implementation of a new approach. Mr. Grunes concludes that, by supplementing a definitional approach to obscenity with a deference toward
state policy interest, a majority of the Burger Court has maintained an
anti-pornography, or freedom restricting, policy with a significant degree
of consistency.
INTRODUCTION

Following the re-election of Richard M. Nixon to the presidency,
some commentators predicted that there would be dramatic reversals
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in the pro-civil liberty policies of the Supreme Court. ' After all, the
new President had pledged to seek changes in Supreme Court
policy-making by using his power of appointment to replace liberal
activist justices with what he called "judicial conservatives" who believed in a "strict constructionist" interpretation of the Constitution,
and who would adhere to the principles of judicial restraint. 2 Nixon
was able to use this power four times. 3 Although he was unable to
select an absolute majority of justices who met his criteria, he is generally credited with altering the ideological balance and transforming
what had been called the Warren Court 4 into the current Burger
Court. 5 Yet, there have been relatively few reversals in policy.
Indeed, if there has been any discernible pattern in Burger Court
decision-making, it has been to make minor adjustments rather than
to overturn past liberal policies. 6 One policy area where there seeAls
to have been a significant reversal, however, is that of obscenity.
The change from what was widely regarded as a permissive approach to obscenity to a much more restrictive policy represented
one of the first major changes by the Burger Court. It also was one of
the first instances in which the high Court adopted a policy that was
in harmony with the views of the Nixon Administration. 7 What is

I

See, e.g., JAMES F. SIMON, IN His OWN IMAGE 157 (New York: David McKay Company,
Inc., 1973); Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term: Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine in a Changing Court, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10 (1972).
2 Nixon's requirements for selecting Supreme Court justices are summarized in S. WASBY,
CHANGE 12-18 (1976).
3 Chief Justice Warren Burger joined the Court in June 1969, Justice Harry Blackmun in

CONTINUITY AND

June, 1970, and Justices Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist in January, 1972. [Current Term]
S.

CT. BULL. (CCH) vi-ix.

4 The "Warren Court" refers to the Supreme Court during the time period when Earl
Warren was its Chief Justice (1953-1969). For the general examination and history of the Warren era, see R. SAYLER, THE WARREN COURT (New York: Chelsea House, 1968).
5 It has been argued that the "Burger Court" did not begin until after the fourth Nixon
appointment. See A. Winter, The Changing Parameters of Substantive Equal Protection: From
Jhe Warren to the Burger Era, 23 EMORY L. J. 657, 659-661 (1974). While this and other
designations such as "Last Warren Court" and "Interim Court" have merits as analytic constructs, they also have a tendency to mask the early influence of Chief Justice Burger in policy
areas such as obscenity. Thus, for our purposes, the designation "Burger Court" will apply to
the entire period following the appointment of the new Chief Justice.
' Several scholars have reached this judgment. See, e.g., J.W. Howard, Jr., Discussant's
Remarks: "Is the Burger Court a Nixon Court?," 23 EMORY L.J. 747 (1974); Washy, supra note
2, at 2-8. Recent decisions involving the Miranda rules and capital punishment have led some
commentators to question this thesis. See Lesley Oelsner, Now, Clearly It is a Burger Court,
Just Right of Center, N.Y. Times, July 11, 1976, § 4, at 8, Col. 1. Compare id. with N. Lewin,
Is There a Burger Court?, 175 THE NEW REPUBLIC, 20-23 (Sept. 11, 1976).
' President Nixon's view of obscenity is discussed in The Obscenity Report: The Report to
the Task Force on Pornography and Obscenity 72 (1970). Nixon believed that while "Government could maintain the dikes against obscenity . .. only people can turn the tide." Id.
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noteworthy, however, is that the change occurred after a prestigious
presidential commission had recommended, by a substantial vote, the
abolition of all legislation which prohibited consenting adults from
having access to sexually oriented material, and at a time when a
majority of the justices were liberal holdovers from the Warren Court
era. 8 Despite these inhibiting factors, the Burger Court successfully
curtailed the further development and application of Warren Court
policy, achieved a reversal of past policy, and then adopted a new
approach to obscenity. 9
While the appointment of new and more conservative justices
may be the most visible reason for the change in obscenity policy, the
absence of reversals in other policy areas suggests the existence of
another explanation. It will be argued here that other factors, especially the internal disagreement of the justices and the lack of clarity
in Warren Court pronouncements, combined to create an environment which was especially conducive to policy change.
This view of legal change is based, in part, on the result of impact studies conducted by social scientists. 10 Specifically, it has been
hypothesized that factors such as the absence of unanimity, the existence of numerous concurring and dissenting opinions, and the lack of
an "opinion of the Court" all tend to reduce full compliance with
Supreme Court decisions." Apparently, these factors undermine the
legitimacy of Supreme Court decisions; policies are perceived as
being less than "authoritative" and more amenable to reinterpretation.
Although most impact studies have concentrated on examining
the effects of judicial decisions on other institutions, the argument
here is that the lack of "authoritativeness" in Supreme Court
decision-making during an earlier period can significantly influence
the substance of later Court policy. Policies adopted within a
framework of internal disagreement may not be conducive to long
range support. Justices may feel that they are not bound to follow
such "weak" precedent. Moreover, if majority support is viewed as
a Twelve of the seventeen commissioners supported this recommendation. See The Report
of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography 51-52 (1970).
9 All of these policy changes were accomplished prior to the appointment of an absolute
majority of new justices by the Nixon-Ford administration. The absolute majority was realized
with President Ford's appointment of John Paul Stevens who took his seat on the high court on
December 17, 1975. For a list of Nixon's previous appointees, see note 3 supra.
'0 S. WASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: SOME PERSPECTIVES

44 (1970).
11 Barth, Perception and Acceptance of Supreme Court Decisions at the State and Local

Level, 17 J. PuB. L. 314 (1968).
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the proper indicator for determining whether a policy is to be considered as "authoritative" or binding, then a strong argument can be
made that no such policy existed at the end of the Warren Court
period. If these assumptions are correct, then it would appear that
the justices appointed during the Nixon-Ford years inherited a policy
situation that was especially ripe for change.
This study will be concerned with describing and explaining the
change in the obscenity policy of the United States Supreme Court.
For the purposes of analysis, obscenity will be treated as a public
policy problem involving a clash between fundamental. constitutional
guarantees and other societal goals. In searching for a constitutionally
acceptable definition and test for obscenity, for example, the justices
have been asked to balance the national commitment to freedom of
expression, as embodied in the first amendment, against competing
societal goals such as the safeguarding of public morals and the protection of juveniles. However, neither a general policy analysis 12 nor
a detailed historical survey of changes in constitutional doctrine are
the primary objective of this article. 13 Rather, the emphasis will be
placed on charting the changing and divergent views of the individual
justices with the purpose of suggesting a theory of legal change respecting the law of obscenity. Both what the justices have written and
how they have voted with respect to the problem of obscenity will be
examined. While consideration will be given to all obscenity cases
except those involving procedural questions, the primary interest will
be with those decisions rendered since 1966-a period that encompasses the "final" Warren Court position on obscenity as well as the
new approach of the Burger Court.
I
THE LEGACY OF THE WARREN COURT

Although obscenity had long been a social and political concern
in America, it was not until the Warren Court period that the nation's
12 A general policy analysis of Supreme Court decision-making through the early Burger

Court period has been made by Martin Shapiro. See Shapiro, Obscenity Law: A Public Policy
Analysis, 20 J. PUB. L. 503-21 (1972).

13 Systematic studies of doctrinal changes appear in: Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of
Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REv. 5 (1960); Rogge, The
High Court of Obscenity-i, 41 U. COLO. L. REV. 1-50 (1969); Rogge, The High Court of
Obscenity-il, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 201-59 (1969); Slough & McAnny, Obscenity and Constitutional Freedom-PartI1, 8 ST. Louis U. J. 449-532 (1964).

In addition, the discussion of several Court decisions may be found in Krislov, From
Ginzburg to Ginsberg: The Unhurried Children's Hour in Obscenity Litigation, 1968 SuP. CT.
REV. 153-97, and Magrath, The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of Roth, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 7-77.
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highest judicial authority began directing full attention to the constitutional issues raised by governmental regulation and suppression
of obscenity. 1 4 Once the door of involvement was opened, however,
the Supreme Court seemed to become preoccupied with the problem
of obscenity. During a thirteen year period, the Court rendered decisions in no fewer than fifty-seven obscenity cases, deciding at least
one case in every term except two. While some of these cases raised
procedural questions, the great majority (78.9%) involved issues of
free expression, generally requiring the Court to articulate or apply
some constitutional standard for determining whether material was or
was not legally obscene. Given this involvement, it is not suprising
that the Court often resorted to the per curiarn method of disposition.
Formal opinions were delivered in approximately one-third of the
obscenity cases and in only 26.6% of the cases involving basic first
amendment questions. Table 1 gives a summary of the Warren
Court's output in this policy area and the method used to dispose of
these cases.
Table 1 15
Summary of Decisions on the Merits Made by the
Warren Court in Obscenity Cases by
Method of Disposition
Method of Disposition
Obscenity Case Classification

Formal

Per
Curiam

Totals

Constitutional Standard ..............
Procedural Safeguards ................

12
8

33
4

45
12

Totals ...............................

20

37

57

The most salient characteristic of the Warren Court in the area of
obscenity was its lack of internal consistency. Although the justices
were occasionally unanimous in outlook, the predominant pattern was
14

Obscenity had been given passing attention prior to the Warren Court period. In Ex

parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878), for example, dicta comments were used to support the
position that the regulation of obscenity was not prohibited by the first amendment. Id. at 736.
Fundamental constitutional issues were raised in Doubleday & Co., Inc. v. New York, 297 N.Y.
687, 77 N.E.2d 6 (Ct. App. 1947), aff'd, 335 U.S. 848 (1948), but the Court divided equally
(Justice Frankfurter not participating) and did not render any opinion. 335 U.S. at 848.
15 Constitutional Standard-Formal Disposition: Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969);
United Artists Corp. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of
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one of disagreement and factionalism. While the Court seldom divided five-to-four, 16 more than four-fifths of the cases involving nonprocedural issues were resolved in split decisions. As can be seen in
Table 2, split decisions were commonplace in cases decided by both
17
the formal and per curiam methods.
Table 2 18
Unanimity in Obscenity Cases Decided by the
Warren Court by Method of Disposition
Method of Disposition
Decision

Formal

Per Curiam

Split .................................
Unanimous ........................

83.3% (10)
16.7% ( 2)

84.8% (27)
15.2% ( 6)

Totals .........................

100.0% (12)

100.0% (33)

Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Mishkin v. New York,
383 U.S. 502 (1966); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964); Manual Enterprises,
Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962); Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957). Constitutional
Standard-Per Curiam Disposition: Henry v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 655 (1968); Rabeck v. New
York, 391 U.S. 462 (1968); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 391 U.S. 53 (1968); City of
Dallas v. Interstate Circuit, Inc., 391 U.S. 53 (1968); Felton v. City of Pensacola, 390 U.S. 340
(1968); Robert-Arthur Management Corp. v. Tennessee, 389 U.S. 578 (1968); I. M. Amusement
Corp. v. Ohio, 389 U.S. 573 (1968); Chance v. California, 389 U.S. 89 (1967); Central Magazine
Sales, Ltd. v. United States, 389 U.S. 50 (1967); Conner v. City of Hammond, 389 U.S. 48
(1967); Landau v. Fording, 388 U.S. 456 (1967); Schackman v. California, 388 U.S. 454 (1967);
Mazes v. Ohio, 388 U.S. 453 (1967); A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 388 U.S. 452
(1967); Books, Inc. v. United States, 388 U.S. 449 (1967); Potomac News Co. v. United States,
389 U.S. 47 (1967); Corinth Publications, Inc. v. Wesberry, 388 U.S. 448 (1967); Aday v.

United States, 388 U.S. 447 (1967); Avansino v. New York, 388 U.S. 446 (1967); Sheperd v.
New York, 388 U.S. 444 (1967); Cobert v. New York, 388 U.S. 443 (1967); Ratner v. California,
388 U.S. 442 (1967); Friedman v. New York, 388 U.S. 441 (1967); Keney v. New York, 388
U.S. 440 (1967); Gent v. Arkansas, 386 U.S. 767 (1967); Austin v. Kentucky, 386 U.S. 767
(1967); Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967); Redmond v. United States, 384 U.S. 264
(1966); Grove Press, Inc. v. Gerstein, 378 U.S. 577 (1964); Tralins v. Gerstein, 378 U.S. 576
(1964); Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958); One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S.
371 (1958); Mounce v. United States, 355 U.S. 180 (1957). Procedural Safeguards-Formal
Disposition: Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378
U.S. 205 (1964); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); Marcus v. Search Warrant,
367 U.S. 717 (1961); Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961); Smith v. California, 361
U.S. 147 (1959); Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959); Kingsley Books, Inc.
v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957). Procedural Safeguards-Per Curiam Disposition: Lee Art
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An examination of the ten non-unanimous cases decided with full
written opinions demonstrates the extent of the internal disagreement. In these ten cases, forty-one separate opinions were submitted:
seven majority opinions, three judgments of the Court, fourteen concurring opinions, and seventeen dissenting opinions. Thus, the justices submitted more than four times as many opinions as were
necessary to resolve these cases. Moreover, not one of these cases
was resolved without the filing of at least one concurring or dissenting
opinion.
Of course, some Warren Court justices were more active than
others in these ten non-unanimous decisions. As Table 3 helps to
illustrate, Justice William Brennan, Jr. wrote most of the majority
Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636 (1968); Tietel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139
(1968); Trans-Lux Distributing Corp. v. Board of Regents, 380 U.S. 259 (1965); Adams Newark
Theatre Co. v. City of Newark, 354 U.S. 931 (1957).
16 There was a one vote majority in Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966), and
Landau v. Fording, 388 U.S. 456 (1967).
17 This is somewhat contrary to the expected breakdown of unanimous and split decisions
during the Warren Court period. In doing a psychological analysis of the 1961-1962 term of the
Supreme Court, for example, Glendon Schubert discovered that cases resolved by the use of
per curiam opinions were more likely to be unanimous than split. See Predictionsfrom a
Psychometric Model, in

JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR:

A

READER IN THEORY AND RESEARCH

552--58 (G.

Schubert ed. 1964).
18Split Decisions-Formal Disposition: United Artists Corp. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S.
676 (1968); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968); Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966); Ginzburg v. United
States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Jacobellis v. Ohio,
378 U.S. 184 (1964); Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962); Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Unanimous DecisionsFormal Disposition: Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380
(1957). Split Decisions-Per Curiam Disposition: Henry v. Louisiana, 393 U.S. 655 (1968);
Rabeck v. New York, 391 U.S. 462 (1968); Felton v. City of Pensacola, 390 U.S. 340 (1968);
Robert-Arthur Management Corp. v. Tennessee, 389 U.S. 578 (1968); I.M. Amusement Corp.
v. Ohio, 389 U.S. 573 (1968); Chance v. California, 389 U.S. 89 (1967); Central Magazine Sales,
Ltd. v. United States, 389 U.S. 50 (1967); Conner v. City of Hammond, 389 U.S. 48 (1967);
Potomac News Co. v, United States, 389 U.S. 47 (1967); Landau v. Fording, 388 U.S. 456
(1967); Schackman v. California, 388 U.S. 454 (1967); Mazes v. Ohio, 388 U.S. 453 (1967); A
Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 388 U.S. 452 (1967); Books, Inc. v. United States, 388
U.S. 449 (1967); Corinth Publications, Inc. v. Wesberry, 388 U.S. 448 (1967); Aday v. United
States, 388 U.S. 447 (1967); Avansino v. New York, 388 U.S. 446 (1967); Sheperd v. New York,
388 U.S. 444 (1967); Cobert v. New York, 388 U.S. 443 (1967); Ratner v. California, 388 U.S.
442 (1967); Friedman v. New York, 388 U.S. 441 (1967); Keney v. New York, 388 U.S. 440
(1967); Gent v. Arkansas, 386 U.S. 767 (1967); Austin v. Kentucky, 386 U.S. 767 (1967); Redrup
v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967); Grove Press, Inc. v. Gerstein, 378 U.S. 577 (1964); Tralins
v. Gerstein, 378 U.S. 576 (1964). Unanimous Decisions-Per Curiam Disposition: Interstate
Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 391 U.S. 53 (1968); City of Dallas v. Interstate Circuit, Inc., 391
U.S. 53 (1968); Redmond v. United States, 384 U.S. 264 (1967); Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958); One, Inc. v. Olsen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958); Mounce v. United States,
355 U.S. 180 (1957).
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opinions in cases decided by the formal method. Justices Black and
Stewart wrote the greatest number of concurring opinions while Justice John Marshall Harlan wrote the most dissents. With respect to
the total number of written opinions, Justices Black, Brennan, and
Harlan were the most prolific.
Table 3 19
Summary of Written Opinions Submitted in
Obscenity Cases Decided by Formal
Method of Disposition by
Individual Justice
Opinions Written By

B B C D F F H M S WW

r
t

Total

r
Majority .....................
Judgment of Court .......
Concurring ...................
Dissenting ...................

0
0
4
3

4
2
1
0

0
0
0
2

0
0
2
3

Total ...................... 7 7 2 5

0
0
0
1

1
0
0
0

0
1
2
4

2
0
0
0

0
0
4
2

0
0
1
1

0
0
0
1

7
3
14
17

1 1 7 2 6 2 1

410

Persistent internal disagreement was also manifested by the increasing use of the per curiam method for resolving obscenity cases.
Beginning with the October 1966 term, this was to become the pre-

19 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); United Artists Corp. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S.
676 (1968); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968); Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966); Ginzburg v. United
States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Jacobellis v. Ohio,
378 U.S. 184 (1964); Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962); Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Butler v. Michigan, 352
U.S. 380 (1957).
Although twelve cases were decided via formal method, a single majority opinion was used
to resolve Roth and Alberts together and Interstate Circuit and United Artists together.
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dominant method used by the Court as the justices openly conceded
their inability to agree on any one approach to the problem of obscenity. 2 0 Since agreement seemed impossible, the justices chose to substitute their own individual viewpoints, often expressed seriatim, in
place of a broadly based and unified approach, which often resulted
in ambiguous policy or no clear-cut policy at all.
A. What the Justices Said-I: The Basic Policy
With one notable exception, the justices on the Warren Court
were unsuccessful in mobilizing majority support behind a single approach to the problem of obscenity. 2 1 That exception was the land22
mark decision of Roth v. United States and Alberts v. California.
The Roth-Alberts opinion of 1957 marked the first major obscenity
pronouncement of the Warren Court 23 and the last time that a majority of the justices would subscribe to a common standard for determining obscenity. 2 4 Yet, the approach set forth in this case proved
to be so vague, imprecise, and confusing as to undermine any chance
25
for long term support.
20 See note 68 infra and text %ccompanying notes 21-68 infra.
21 See Magrath, supra note 13, at 10.

22 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Both Roth v. United States and Alberts v. California were heard and
decided together. Roth, who published, sold and advertised books, photographs and magazines,
was convicted under the federal obscenity statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976), for sending obscene materials through the mails. 354 U.S. at 480. Alberts, the operator of a mail-order
business, was convicted under California law, CAL. PENAL CODE § 311 (West 1955), for keeping
for sale obscene books and for publishing an obscene advertisement of his stock. 354 U.S. at
481.
23 The Court's first significant intervention in the area of obscenity occurred in Butler v.
Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957), where it found that an obscenity statute banning material which
was unsuitable with regard to minors but which was not objectionable with regard to adults was
unconstitutional. Id. at 383-84. However, the question of obscenity vis-i-vis the constitutional
guarantees of speech and press were squarely faced for the first time in Roth. See Froessel, Law
and Obscenity, 27 ALBANY L. REV. 1 (1963); Magrath, supra note 13, at 9.
24 Despite the single majority opinion, however, the justices divided differently in each
case: six-to-three in Roth and seven-to-two in Alberts. Only five of the justices, Brennan,
Frankfurter, Burton, Clark, and Whittaker, agreed on a common standard for determining
obscenity. For an overview of the obscenity decisions of the Warren Court, see Magrath, supra
note 13; 6 SANTA CLARA LAw. 206 (1966); 19 STAN. L. REV. 167 (1966); 8 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 121 (1966).
25 No test, however, was ever expected to achieve mathematical precision. As the Court
observed all that the Constitution mandates is "that the language 'conveys sufficiently definite
warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices." 354 U.S. at 491 (quoting United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1946)). Compare
Gerber, A Suggested Solution to the Riddle of Obscenity, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 834, 835 (1964)
(maintaining that Court should establish definite test for obscenity) with Lockhart & McClure,
Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5, 121
(1960) (opposing an absolute standard).
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In entering the area of obscenity, seven of the nine justices
opted to embrace and legitimize what other decision-makers had always assumed, 2 6 namely, that the seemingly absolute language of the
first amendment did not prohibit Congress or the states by way of the
fourteenth amendment, from making laws which regulated the dissemination of obscenity. 2 7 Only Justices Black and Douglas, the two
"literalists" on the Court, refused to support the view that government possessed the authority to impose restraints upon the exercise
of first amendment freedoms when other more important individual
2 8
and societal interests were at stake.
The majority opinion, written by Justice Brennan, was confusing,
however, in that it seemed to say one thing while doing another.
What the Court did was to affirm the convictions and uphold the
validity of both federal and state obscenity laws. 2 9 Yet, it accomplished this within the framework of permissive rhetoric. None of
the justices disagreed with Justice Brennan, for example, when he
explained that "sex and obscenity are not synonymous," and that "the
portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not
itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection of
freedom of speech and press."30
Despite this liberal language, the majgrity was not about to afford constitutional protection to obscene material. 3 ' Seven of the
26 See, e.g., 354 U.S. at 484-85 (Court noted legislative response to issue of obscenity).
354 U.S. at 481-83. It had long been recognized since the ratification of the Constitution

27

that libel, blasphemy, and profanity were outside the protection guaranteed by the first
amendment and were subject to statutory proscription. Id. at 482; see, e.g., Beauharnais v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (libelous utterances not constitutionally protected speech);

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (state's restriction upon speech
leading to breach of peace does not violate right of free speech); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1923) (punishment of speech advocating overthrow of government by force is constitution-

ally permissible).
28

354 U.S. at 514. For a discussion of Justice Douglas' and justice Black's dissent, see notes

47-48 infra and accompanying text.
29 The Roth-Alberts Court was concerned with the question of whether two particular
obscenity statutes were constitutional, not with the question of whether the material involved
was in fact obscene, and hence the issue of obscenity was treated in a rather abstract manner.
8
See 354 U.S. at 481 n. .

For instances in which the Roth test was applied to determine the obscenity of specific
material, see A Book Named John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure v. Massachusetts,
383 U.S. 413 (1966); Attorney General v. Book Named "Tropic of Cancer," 345 Mass. 11, 184

N.E.2d 328 (1962); McCauley v. Tropic of Cancer, 20 Wis. 2d 134, 121 N.W.2d 545 (1963).
30 354 U.S. at 478 (footnotes omitted); cf. Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity,
The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REv. 5, 59 (1960) (justices in Roth-

Alberts were concerned with "hard-core" pornography).
31 For a discussion of the question of whether obscenity should be protected speech and the
role the government should play in the censorship of obscene material, see Falk, The Roth
Decision in the Light of Sociological Knowledge, 54 A.B.A.J. 288 (1968); Henkin, Morals and
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justices accepted the view that obscenity could be -distinguished from
other categories of speech and that only the latter were entitled to
protection under the first amendment. 3 2 According to the Court, "all
ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importanceunorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion" are protected against governmental restraint. 3 3 Obscene ideas, on the other hand, are subject to regulation because they are, by definition, "utterly without redeeming
34
social importance."
Having adopted this "two-tier" approach 35 to freedom of expression, the core problem became the formulation of a satisfactory test
for determining obscenity. The goal was to devise a standard which
would enable others to clearly distinguish unprotected obscene ex36
pression from constitutionally protected non-obscene expression.
Toward this objective, five of the Justices, 37 Brennan, Frankfurter,
Burton, Clark and Whittaker, proposed the following test: "whether
to the average person applying contemporary community standards,
the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to pruthe Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 391 (1963); Censorship and Obscenity: A Panel Discussion, 66 DICK. L. REV. 421 (1961); 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1063 (1964); 19 STAN.
L. REV. 167, 187-89 (1966).

32 354 U.S. at 485. Justices Douglas and Black dissented. Id. at 508-14 (Douglas, J., joined
by Black, J., dissenting).
33 ld. at 484. For a discussion on the concept of "redeeming social importance, see
Lockhart & McClure, supra note 25, at 95-99.
34 354 U.S. at 484. This position was consistent with the one set forth in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), where Justice Murphy declared that there exist "certain welldefined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem," such as "the lewd and obscene." Id.
at 571-72. But cf. 354 U.S. at 511-12 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (where first amendment rights
are involved, the collective conscience of community is not more proper standard with regard to
obscenity than it would be with regard to religion, politics, or philosophy).
35 An excellent discussion of this approach can be found in Kalven, The Metaphysics of the
Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 315.

36 In fact, the Warren Court was unable to reach a consensus with respect to defining
obscenity. Instead, each judge utilized separate standards when facing this issue. See, e.g.,
Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962). This inability to agree on a common obscenity
standard prompted Justice Brennan to comment:
In the face of this divergence of opinion, the Court began the practice in 1967 in
Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, . . . of per curiam reversals of convictions for
the dissemination of materials that at least five members of the Court, applying
their separate tests, deemed not to be obscene.
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slatin, 413 U.S. 49, 82-83 (1973) (Brennan, j., dissenting); cf Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. at 507 (Harlan, J., concurring) (federal government can constitutionally
restrict only "hard-core" pornography and further restrictions should be left to states); Jacobellis
v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (first and fourteenth amendments
limit governmental restrictions on obscenity to hard-core pornography).
37 See note 24 supra.
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rient interest."- 38 Reliance on such vague and generally undefined
concepts as "average person," "contemporary community standards,"
and "appeal to prurient interest," however, hardly seemed designed
to increase clarity in this area. 3 9 The Court's standard, moreover,
seem to lack sufficient preciseness with respect to the protection of
non-obscene or "borderline" sexual material.
Ironically, this test was intended to be more permissive and effective than other standards, including the popular formula, articulated in Regina v. Hicklin, 40 which judged obscenity by the effect of
isolated passages from the material in question on the minds and
morals of young people. 41 Actually, the new test neither altered the
restrictive rationale of Hicklin nor provided a more satisfactory standard for distinguishing between obscene and non-obscene expression.
While the substitution of "dominant" effect for isolated passages 42
and adult values for juvenile ones were positive developments, the
Brennan led majority, nevertheless, remained wedded to the underlying premise of Hicklin, namely, that government possessed the authority to regulate the thoughts of its citizens. In the words of Justice
Brennan, material which appealed to the prurient interest could be
38 354 U.S. at 489.

39 The difficulty inherent in a case-by-case application of the Roth test is perhaps best
exemplified by the inconsistent decisions of various courts with respect to Henry Miller's Tropic
of Cancer. Holding Tropic of Cancer not obscene and therefore protected by freedom of expression: Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, 59 Cal. 2d 901, 383 P.2d 152, 31 Cal. Rptr. 800, cert. denied,
375 U.S. 957 (1963); Attorney General v. Book Named "Tropic of Cancer," 345 Mass. 11, 184
N.E.2d 328 (1962); McCauley v. Tropic of Cancer, 20 Wis. 2d 134, 121 N.W.2d 545 (1963).
Holding Tropic of Cancer to be obscene: Besig v. United States, 208 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1953);
People v. Fritch, 13 N.Y.2d 119, 192 N.E.2d 713, 243 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1963).
- L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868).
41 The Hicklin test, widely used in American courts until the 1920's, was set forth in 1868
by Chief Justice Alexander Cockburn in the English case of Regina v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360
(1868). Based upon the examination of isolated passages, the test under Hicklin was "whether
the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds
are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall."
Id. at 371.
Although the Hicklin formula prevailed as the dominant test in American jurisprudence, it
had been rejected by several American courts prior to Roth. See, e.g., United States v. One
Book Entitled Ulysses, 72 F.2d 705, 707 (1935) (holding Joyce's Ulysses was not obscene under
federal statute barring importation of obscene books). When the Supreme Court rejected the
Hicklin test as unconstitutional, it did so on the ground that the practice of merely examining
isolated passages might result in declaring material which legitimately discusses sex obscene.
354 U.S. at 489.
42 See, e.g., Haldeman v. United States, 340 F.2d 59 (10th Cir. 1965); Ackerman v. United
States, 293 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1961); In re Louisiana News Co., 187 F. Supp. 241 (D.D.C.
(1960). But cf. Kahm v. United States, 300 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 859
(1962) (isolated passages of book found obscene when used alone in an advertisement, even
though book, taken as whole, was not obscene).

19781

OBSCENITY LAW

defined as "material having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts."43
Thus, the Court impliedly accepted the view that, at least to some
of sexually impure thoughts was a legitimate
extent, the prevention
44
policy objective.
Despite the one-sidedness of the votes, a substantial amount of
internal disagreement was evident in Roth-Alberts. Chief Justice
Warren, for example, advocated a "variable" approach which, instead
of viewing obscenity as an inherent characteristic, accepted it as a
quality which depended upon such factors as the manner of its advertisement and distribution, the intended recipient group, the medium
utilized, and geographical areas of distribution. 45 Conceding that different results would be produced in different settings, Warren maintained that government possessed the power to punish people like
Roth and Alberts who were "plainly engaged in the commercial
exploitation of the morbid and shameful......46 Justices Douglas
and Black, on the other hand, charted out the most permissive position, arguing that the first amendment places all speech in a preferred
position and that only material which "is so closely brigaded with
illegal action as to be an inseparable part of it" 47 was subject to regulation. 4 8 Needless to say, Justices Douglas and Black did not believe
that the "arousal of sexual thoughts" fell into this category. Finally,
there was the unique position of Justice Harlan who argued that state
governments possessed far more authority than did the national government in the area of obscenity. 49 State governments, Justice
Harlan stated, could enact any reasonable regulation of sexual moral-

354 U.S. at 487 n.20.
4' However, not all the justices accepted this viewpoint. Justice Harlan maintained that the
"

federal government had no right to prevent the distribution of a book regardless of the type of
thoughts it might arouse and further remarked that some of the world's greatest literature,
which arouses lustful thought, would be labelled obscene under this test. 354 U.S. at 507
(Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Douglas went even further, asserting
that punishment can only be imposed for provoking overt acts rather than mere thoughts. Id. at

508-14 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
41 See 354 U.S. at 494-96. Under a concept of "variable obscenity," obscenity is not viewed
as an inherent or constant quality. Rather it is determined by the circumstances of dissemination and the effect upon the audience which the material is designed to reach. Thus material
that is characterized as obscene may not be so at all times and places and under all circumstances. The issue of obscenity will then depend on certain variables or factors. See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 25, at 68-70, 77-88. Semonche, Definitional and Contextual
Obscenity: The Supreme Court's New and Disturbing Accommodation, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REV.

1173, 1173-77 (1966).
46 354 U.S. at 496 (Warren, C.J., concurring).

41 Id. at 514 (Douglas, J., joined by Black, J., dissenting).
48 Id. at 508-14 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
41 Id. at 496-508 (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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ity if it related to a legitimate state interest such as the preservation
of moral standards, the prevention of anti-social conduct, or the protection of personal privacy. 50 The national government, however,
was prohibited by the first amendment from using its postal and
commerce powers to regulate anything other than a limited and
largely undefinable class of expression known as "hard-core" pornography. 51
Despite considerable criticism and commentary from the scholarly community, 2 it was seven years before the Warren Court, in
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 53 sought to re-examine the Roth-Alberts standard.
By this time, however, significant changes had taken place in the
composition and ideology of the Court. Justices Frankfurter, Burton
and Whittaker-conservatives who had supported the Brennan formula of 1957-had been replaced by three more liberal men: Arthur
Goldberg, Potter Stewart, and Byron White. 54 Of the new justices,
only White was to indicate adherence to the original test. 55
There was no "opinion of the Court"--no "authoritative" policy
announced in Jacobellis. Although a plurality of the Justices (Warren,
Goldberg, and Clark) reluctantly supported the Brennan formula in
Roth-Alberts "until a more satisfactory definition [was] evolved,"' 56
only Goldberg was prepared to accept Justice Brennan's view that the
"community" referred to in the Roth-Alberts test was
a national
rather than a state or local one. 57 Chief Justice Warren, joined by
Justice Clark, preferred the use of local instead of national standards. 58 But, it was not clear whether they accepted Justice Brennan's
50

Id.

at 502 (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).

Id. at 506-07 (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
" See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 25. A summary of the reaction in the press and
periodicals may be found in L. BARKER & T. BARKER, FREEDOMS, COURTS, POLITICS AND
STUDIES IN CIVIL LIBERTIES (1965). The criticism and commentary was engendered mainly by
the many questions the Court left unresolved. The resulting ambiguity presented problems for
law enforcement officials as well as the courts. Some of these questions included: what was
meant by the term "prurient interest" and "socially redeeming importance;" who was to determine and define "contemporary community standards," and what was the relevant community?
51

See L. BARKER & T.

BARKER, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 119 (2d ed. 1975).

378 U.S. 184 (1964).
54 Justice Stewart replaced Justice Burton in 1958. Justice White replaced Justice Whittaker
in 1962, and Justice Goldberg replaced Justice Frankfurter in 1962.
5' See, e.g., Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 462 (1966) (White, J., dissenting). In
Memoirs, Justice White specifically rejected the majority's criterion of "utterly devoid of socially
redeeming value" which altered the original Roth test. Id.
66 378 U.S. at 200 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
51 Id. at 198 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
5' Id. at 200 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). This preference for a local standard was based in
part on the belief that a national standard was not provable. Id.
53
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view that the test for obscenity should not be applied until after it
had been determined that the material was "utterly without redeeming
social importance" and went "substantially beyond customary limits of
candor."59 Justice Stewart, on the other hand, refused to get involved with the Roth-Alberts test. Instead, he indicated support for
the "hard-core" pornography standard of Justice Harlan, though he
would use it in both state and federal cases. 60 As for Justices
Douglas and Black, they continued to favor the granting of first
61
amendment protection to virtually all sexually oriented expression.
The final attempt to win majority support for a single constitutional standard came in 1966 in the case of Memoirs v. Massachusetts.6 2 In what amounted to a major reformulation of the
Roth-Alberts standard, a three justice plurality, Justice Brennan
joined by Justice Fortas and Chief Justice Warren, set forth a test in
which each of the following had to "coalesce" for a finding of obscenity: "(a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole [must
appeal] to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material [must affront]
contemporary community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material [must be] utterly
without redeeming social value." 6 3 The most significant part of this
reformulation was that "redeeming social value" had not been officially elevated to a co-equal status with the other elements of RothAlberts. Since almost all expression can be construed as having at
least some minimal "social value," it would appear that these three
justices were advocating an approach that was far more protective of
sexually oriented material than was the original Roth-Alberts formula. 64
59 Id. at 191.
60 Id. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Harlan's approach to the obscenity issue involved two distinct tests for the state and federal governments. On the federal level, Justice

Harlan called for a "hard-core" pornography standard which would allow a national ban on hardcore pornography but would prohibit such a proscription on borderline material. On a state level,
Justice Harlan contended for a test of rationality. Under this approach the state would have the

authority to proscribe material which was reasonably found to treat sex in a fundamentally offensive manner. Thus the state would be able to ban borderline material. This bifurcated standard rested on the rationale that the Constitution required limited or restrictive Lans on expression
by the federal government, but allowed greater latitude to the states which bear the direct
responsibility for preserving the moral fabric of their communities. Id.

at 203-04.

61 Id. at 196 (Black, J., concurring).
62 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
63 Id. at 418.

64 The requirement that all three criteria be met before a given work could be labeled
obscene clearly imposed a greater burden on the censor than did the test of "prurient appeal"
which automatically indicated the absence of any social value. Previously under the Roth standard material which had been designated as obscene was denied first amendment protection
because it was considered to be without any "redeeming social importance." Jacobellis v. Ohio,
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Like Jacobellis, the Memoirs decision produced no majority
viewpoint. 65 With the exception of the Chief Justice, all of the justices maintained previously announced positions. 66 In Chief Justice
Warren's case, the shift seemed more related to obtaining Justice
Brennan's support for his view of "variable" obscenity than indicative
67
of any change in personal policy preference.
B. What the Justices Said-II: Toward a More Permissive Policy
Following the failure to secure majority support in Memoirs, the
justices began to openly acknowledge that they were hopelessly divided as to the proper standard for determining obscenity. 6 8 There
were to be no further efforts to reformulate Roth-Alberts in quest of a
378 U.S. at 191. But under Memoirs the standard of "redeeming social value" became an independent factor which had to be satisfied as part of the initial determination of obscenity, rather
than as a resultant fact necessarily present where prurient appeal and patent offensiveness were
demonstrated.
The Court indicated, however, that evidence of a purveyor's attitude toward the material in
question, as demonstrated by the manner in which he exploits it, might be determinative of
whether the work actually possesses any social value. 383 U.S. at 420. Thus, treating material as
though it possesses no redeeming social value may lead the Court to find it does not.
65 Separate concurring opinions were written by Justices Douglas, 383 U.S. at 424; Black,
id. at 421; and Stewart, id. Dissenting opinions were filed by Justices Clark, id. at 441; Harlan,
id. at 455; and White, id. at 460.
66 Justice Douglas steadfastly adhered to the position that the first amendment forbids censorship of expression of ideas not linked with illegal action. Id. at 426 (Douglas, J., concurring);
Justice Black, like Justice Douglas, felt that the federal government was without power to
put any type of burden on speech and expression (as distinguished from conduct). Ginzburg v.
United States, 383 U.S. at 476 (Black, J., dissenting); Justice Clark, dissenting, expressed his
disagreement with the majority's revision of the Roth test, which was altered by requiring that
the materials be initially found without redeeming social value. Justice Clark remarked: "Such a
condition rejects the basic holding of Roth and gives the smut artist free rein to carry on his
dirty business." 383 U.S. at 441 (Clark, J., dissenting). He advocated the retention of the Roth
test. Id. at 441-42 (Clark, J., dissenting). Justice White, like Justice Clark, objected to the addition of the "socially redeeming value" element as an individual criterion and believed that the
Roth test should have been retained in its original form. Id. at 462 (White, J., dissenting). Justice
Harlan retained his view that federal suppression of allegedly obscene material should be constitutionally limited to that which is often described as "hard-core pornography." Id. at 457
(Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart also advocated this "hard-core" standard but in both a
state and federal context. Id. at 421; see Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 518 (1966)
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
67 See Semonche, supra note 45, at 1196. For a discussion on "variable" obscenity, see note
45 supra and accompanying text. Chief Justice Warren had been a constant advocate of the
variable approach to obscenity. See, e.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. at 201 (Warren, C.J.,
dissenting); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. at 495 (Warren, C.J., concurring); Kingsley Books,
Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 446 (1957).
68 Justice Harlan summed up this discord when he stated: "The central development that
emerges from the aftermath of Roth v. United States . . . is that no stable approach to the
obscenity problem has yet been devised by this Court." Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. at
455 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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new consensus. Instead, the Warren Court began the practice of disposing of obscenity cases through the use of summary per curiam
judgments, most of which were delivered without written explanation
and thus provided no guidance to those seeking to implement high
court policy. 69 In addition, the justices sought to identify new policy
objectives by adopting a "variable" or contextual approach toward
obscenity. 70
During the post-1966 period, the justices relied greatly on
Redrup v. New York, 7 1 a per curiam decision in which a majority of
the justices voted to overturn convictions for the selling of "girlie"
type magazines and paperback books. In this case, the Court seemed
.to adopt the position that material would be judged on the basis of
separate tests articulated by the different justices then sitting on the
high bench. 72 Its conclusion was that the material in question was
not obscene under any of the standards being advanced by the justices. 73 What is confusing, however, is a statement in the opinion
that the three-element standard set forth by Justices Brennan, Fortas,
and Chief Justice Warren in the Memoirs decision was "not dissimilar" to Justice Stewart's concept of "hard-core" pornography. 74 After
all, it was Justice Stewart who had previously declared: "I shall not
today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to
be embraced within the shorthand description [hard-core pornography]; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligently doing so.
But I know it when I see it .... ."75
Although the justices may have been divided with respect to the
proper standard for determining obscenity, the Redrup approach of

s See, e.g., Avansino v. United States, 388 U.S. 466 (1967); A Quantity of Copies of Books
v. Kansas, 388 U.S. 452 (1967); Rosenbloom v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 450 (1967); Books Inc. v.
United States, 388 U.S. 449 (1967); Corinth Publications, Inc. v. Wesberry, 388 U.S. 448

(1967); Aday v. United States, 388 U.S. 447 (1967); Sheperd v. New York, 388 U.S. 444 (1967);
Datner v. California, 388 U.S. 422 (1967); Friedman v. United States, 388 U.S. 441 (1967);

Keney v. New York, 388 U.S. 440 (1967); Blankenship v. Holding, 387 U.S. 95 (1967); Holding
v. Blankenship, 387 U.S. 94 (1967).
70 For an explanation of this approach, see note 45 supra.
71 386 U.S. 767 (1967). The Court's decision also applied to Gent v. Arkansas and Austin v.
Kentucky, two cases which were decided together with Redrup and which also involved the
distribution of obscene novels and magazines. Id.
72 Id. at 771. These tests or positions included: (1) that the state had no authority to suppress the distribution of obscene material; (2) that the state power to ban obscene material is
limited to a "distinct and clearly identifiable class of material;" (3) that the "social value" element is an independent factor in the obscenity test. Id. at 770-71.
73 Id. at 771.
74 Id. at 770-71.

7' Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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judging material by a combination of judicial tests enabled the generally liberal justices to unite behind a largely undefined but clearly
more permissive obscenity policy. 76 Relying on Redrup, the justices
overturned nearly two dozen convictions involving the dissemination
of books, magazines, and films containing detailed and graphic descriptions of masturbation, homosexuality, sexual intercourse, fellatio,
and sadomasochism. 77 Pictures of naked men and women in sexually
alluring poses were also found to be non-obscene. 78 Perhaps the justices had found wisdom in Justice Stewart's statement after all, for
they seemed to agree on what material was not obscene while continuing to disagree on how to define and actually determine the concept of obscenity. In almost all of the instances mentioned above, the
justices overturned the decisions of lower courts which had employed
and applied Roth-Alberts or some variation of this test. 79 Thus, the
use of the same standards produced different results in different state
and federal courts. Moreover, the citing of Redrup in other summary
per curiam judgments hardly seemed designed to eliminate these discrepancies or increase the guidance offered to the lower courts.
In addition to the use of summary per curiam judgments, the
justices began utilizing a "variable" approach by which the obscenity
of material was determined on the basis of the particular circumstances surrounding dissemination. Although there was little evidence of permissiveness when the justices first began taking this approach, it was later to become the vehicle for what appeared to be a
The Redrup approach can be viewed as encompassing at least two things:
First, where content of publications charged to. be obscene is in question, federal
and state prosecutions will not be successful unless it can be shown that the material involved is what Justice Stewart calls hard-core pornography. Second, it seems
that the Supreme Court has decided that the time has come to begin putting men,
not books or motion pictures, on trial.
Teeter & Pember, The Retreat from Obscenity: Redrup v. New York, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 175,
76

176 (1969).
77 See, e.g., Henry v. Louisiana, 392 U.S. 655 (1968); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629

(1968); Felton v. Pensacola, 390 U.S. 340 (1968); Robert-Arthur Management Corp. v. Tennessee, 389 U.S. 578 (1968); I.M. Amusement Corp. v. Ohio, 389 U.S. 573 (1968); Chance v.
California, 389 U.S. 89 (1967); Conner v. Hammond, 389 U.S. 48 (1967); Schackman v. California, 388 U.S. 454 (1967); Mazes v. Ohio, 388 U.S. 453 (1967); A Quantity of Copies of Books v.

Kansas, 388 U.S. 452 (1967); Corinth Publications v. Wesberry, 388 U.S. 448 (1967); Aday v.
United States, 388 U.S. 447 (1967); Avansino v. New York, 388 U.S. 446 (1967); Sheperd v.
New York, 388 U.S. 444 (1967); Cobert v. New York, 388 U.S. 443 (1967); Ratner v. California,
388 U.S. 442 (1967); Friedman v. New York, 388 U.S. 441 (1967); Keney v. New York, 388

U.S. 440 (1967).
78 See, e.g., Central Magazine Sales Ltd. v. United States, 389 U.S. 50 (1967); Conner v.
City of Hammond, 389 U.S. 48 (1967); Potomac News Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 47 (1967).

79 See note 77 supra.
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major new policy position-the view that the government could not
legitimately control the moral content of a person's thoughts without
violating the first amendment.
The "variable" approach to obscenity was adopted by a majority
of the Court in two highly criticized 1966 cases. 80 In Ginzburg v.
United States,"' Justice Brennan was joined by Chief Justice Warren
(the original supporter of "variable" obscenity), and Justices Fortas,
Clark, and White in holding that the intent of the publisher, as revealed by advertising and marketing techniques, was a relevant factor
in determining whether material was legally obscene. 8 2 According to
these justices, material which was not obscene under any of the judicial tests could still be found to be obscene if "commercial exploitation," i.e., "pandering," was evident in the advertising or distribution
practices of the publisher. 8 3 This view was challenged by Justices
Black, Douglas, Harlan, and Stewart. In separate dissenting opinions,
the majority position was attacked for introducing still more confusion
into the law of obscenity through a judicially created ex post facto
regulation. 84
In Mishkin v. New York, 85 on the other hand, the same five
justice majority held that the "average person" part of the Court's
obscenity test was not applicable when material was designed to appeal to the prurient interest of deviant groups. 8 6 According to Justice Brennan, who wrote the majority opinion, "the prurient appeal
requirement . . . is satisfied if the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest in sex of the mem-

80

See Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463

(1966).
81 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
a2 Id. at 470.
83 Id. at 475-76. This view was also expressed in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413

(1966). In an opinion joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Fortas, Justice Brennan maintained that "the circumstances of production, sale, and publicity are relevant" to the determination of obscenity. Id. at 420.
84 Justice Black expressed this view most forcefully when he noted that Gin-zburg had been
"authoritatively condemned to serve five years in prison for distributing printed matter about
sex which neither Ginzburg nor anyone else could possibly have known to be criminal." 383
U.S. at 476.
85 383 U.S. 502 (1966). Mishkin, a publisher of sadistic and masochistic novels was given a
three year prison sentence and fined $12,000 for hiring authors to write obscene books, for
publishing them, and for possessing them with intent to sell. This conviction was affirmed by
the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 503-04.
86 Id. at 508. Deviant groups were defined as classes of people who are stimulated and
excited by reference to such interests as flagellation, fetishism, and lesbianism as compared with
the average person who is disgusted and sickened by such material. Id. at 508-09.
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bers of that group."3 7 Four of the Justices (Harlan, Stewart, Black,
and Douglas) refused to accept the majority's view with respect to
judging material aimed at sexual deviants. 8 8 Instead, these justices
continued to support previously announced positions on obscenity,
ranging from the absolutism of Justices Black and Douglas, 8 9 to the
"hard-core" pornography view of Justice Stewart, 90 and finally, to the
federal-state position of Justice Harlan. 9 1 Nevertheless, by 1966, a
majority of the Court had accepted the legitimacy of regulating the
commercial exploitation of sex 92 as well as material appealing to the
93
prurient interest of nonconforming sexual groups.
During the last two years of the Warren Court, the "variable"
approach was utilized to establish a significantly more permissive
87 Id. Some of the materials in this case were designed to appeal to those with more unusual sexual preferences than those of the average consumer. It was specifically directed at
sadomasochists, various fetishists, and homosexuals. The defendant claimed that since the book
concerned deviant sexual practices, it did not satisfy the prurient appeal requirement because it
did not appeal to the prurient interests of the average person. Id. at 509. To apply the prurient
interest test to nonconforming groups, the Court modified the "prurient appeal" requirement by
allowing the allure of this genre of material to be judged in terms of the sexual preferences of
the group for which it was intended. Id. Compare Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. at 509
(deviant group test) with Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. at 489 (average person test). For an
analysis of prurient appeal and the Roth test, see Note, Obscenity and the Supreme Court: Nine
Years of Confusion, 19 STAN. L. REV. 167, 171-72 (1966).

8 383 U.S. at 514-18. In a concurring opinion Justice Harlan maintained that the federal
government could not impose upon the states a formula designed to regulate obscenity, with
the exception of hard-core pornography which he defined as "prurient material that is patently
offensive." Id. at 515 (quoting Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 455 (1966)). Dissenting,
Justice Douglas adhered to the proposition that all forms of expression are protected by the first
amendment, a position shared by Justice Black. 383 U.S. at 514 (Douglas, J., dissenting), 515
(Black, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart, also dissenting, espoused the doctrine that unless the
material is hard-core pornography it is protected by the first amendment even against state
statutes. Id. at 518 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
89 383 U.S. at 514, 515 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. at
196 (Black, J., concurring); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. at 508 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
90 383 U.S. at 518 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. at
497 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring).
91383 U.S. at 515 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see, e.g., A Quantity of Copies of Books v.
Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 215 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. at 496
(Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
92 See, e.g., Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966). Commercial exploitation of sex
or "pandering" was deemed to have occurred when "the sexually provocative aspects of the
work 'were deliberately emphasized' in order to earn a profit by exploiting the salaciously disposed." Id. at 472. Thus the circumstances of the promotion and sale of such material should be
considered as an aid in determining its social value. While the pandering rule lead to a conviction in the Ginzburg case, it was not widely used as a deterrent to obscenity in following years.
For an analysis of obscenity convictions founded upon the pandering rule, see C. REMBAR, THE
END OF OBSCENITY 483-89 (1968).

93 See, e.g., 383 U.S. 502. For a discussion of the pruriency test as applied to deviant
groups, see note 87 supra and text accompanying notes 86-92 supra.
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obscenity policy. 94 The change was accomplished in two separate
steps and was aided by the replacement of Justice Clark with the
more liberal Justice Marshall. 9 5 The objective of the new policy
seemed to be the removal of governmental interference with the
96
reading and viewing habits of consenting adults.
The first step in the movement toward a more permissive
obscenity policy 9 7 involved the Court's recognition of the special
governmental interest in protecting the "well-being of its children." 98 In Ginsberg v. New York, 99 for example, six of the justices
found it constitutionally permissible for a state to allow young people
"a more restricted right than that assured to adults to judge and determine for themselves what sex material they may read or see." 100
Speaking for the majority, Justice Brennan 101 explained that it was
entirely "rational" for a state to conclude that obscenity has a detrimental effect on the moral development of juveniles even without any
94 See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559, 564-66 (1969) (private possession of
obscene material is constitutionally protected); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390
U.S. 676, 687-90 (1968) (statute that did not define "sexual promiscuity" or adequately restrict
discretion of National Picture Classification Board to declare film obscene held unconstitutionally vague). See also Comment, Obscenity-A Change in Approach, 18 LoY. L. REv. 319,
321-25 (1972).
95 Thurgood Marshall was nominated by President Johnson on June 13, 1967 and was sworn
in during October 1967. [Current Term] S. CT. BULL. (CCH) vi-ix.
96 See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (mere possession of obscene
material in one's home cannot be regulated by government).
97 This "more permissive obscenity policy" had its roots in Memoirs which advanced the
"utterly without social redeeming value test." 383 U.S. at 418; see notes 62-64 supra and accompanying text.
98 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).
99 390 U.S. 629 (1968). Ginsberg was convicted of selling two "girlie" magazines to a 16 year
old boy in violation of a state statute. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction by holding: (1)
the state has the power to create special provisions for children that reach beyond the scope of
state power over adults; (2) parents and teachers, whose primary responsibility is rearing children, are entitled to the protection of state laws enacted to aid in the performance of that
responsibility; and (3) the state has an independent interest in safeguarding the welfare of children against abuses. Id. at 638-43.
1ooId. at 637. For a statement of the three grounds upon which the adoption of restrictive
policy was justified, see note 99 supra. Control of distribution of objectionable material to minors rather than total prohibition to the general public was strongly urged by Justice Brennan
in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. at 195. Ginsberg takes this view a step further by allowing the
obscenity test to be adjusted by statute when the audience to be protected consists of minors.
390 U.S. at 638. Thus, the purchase of material which is judged not to be obscene for adults
can still be statutorily prohibited to minors. Id. at 636-37; cf. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380,
382-83 (1957) (objectionable, but not obscene, material must be made available to adults even if
it has potentially detrimental effect upon children).
101 Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Warren, White, Marshall. See 390 U.S. at 631.
Separate concurring opinions were written by Justices Harlan, id. at 645, and Stewart. Id. at
648. Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black, wrote a dissenting opinion, id. at 650, as did
Justice Fortas. Id. at 671.
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evidence of causation.10 2 Thus, the justices voted to extend the
Mishkin logic, that prurient appeal may be determined with respect
to special groups, to juveniles by allowing the regulation of sexual
material which appealed to the prurient interest of the average minor
even when it did not appeal to the prurient interest of the average
adult. 103 Yet, as the justices made clear in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v.
City of Dallas, 104 the standard used for determining the acceptability
of material for minors could not be so vague as to endanger the free
flow of material which was entitled to the protection of the Constitu-

tion. 105
The crucial second step in the development of a more liberal
obscenity policy was taken in Stanley v. Georgia,10 6 the last major
obscenity decision of the Warren Court. In establishing "privacy" as
another consideration, 10 7 the Court, speaking through Justice
102 Id. at 641-43. Although the Court recognized that the state's conclusion (i.e., obscenity
has a detrimental effect on juveniles) is not supported by any accepted scientific fact, see, e.g.,
Cairns, Paul & Wishner, Sex Censorship: The Assumptions of Anti-Obscenity Laws and the
Empirical Evidence, 46 MINN. L. REV. 1009, 1035 (1962), this holding was still affirmed. 390
U.S. at 641. The Court reasoned that obscenity lies outside the protection of the first amendment, and that the state must therefore only demonstrate that its actions to protect minors from
objectionable material are "not irrational." Id.
103 390 U.S. at 634-36; cf. Comment, supra note 94, at 323-24 (state may prohibit any
materials believed to be offensive or detrimental to children). Compare Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. at 636 (regulation of material appealing to prurient interest of average minor though
not to average adult) with Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 769-70 (1967) (statute aimed at
minors must assert "a specific and limited state concern for juveniles").
104 390 U.S. 676 (1968). This decision was also applied to the companion case of United
Artists Corp. v. City of Dallas. Id.
105390 U.S. 682-84. Vagueness violative of due process occurs when a statute either prohibits or requires the performance of an act in language so indefinite that a person of average
intelligence must guess at its meaning and disagree as to its application. Connally v. General
Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). See generally Note, Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine
in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 67-75 (1960). There are basically two dangers of
a vague obscenity statute: (1) a violation of due process by punishing someone for acts that were
not clearly prohibited; and (2) a chilling effect on distribution of material that is in fact constitutionally protected. F. SCHAUER, THE LAw OF OBSCENITY 158 (1976). An example of the second
pitfall occurs where distributors of material deemed obscene for children but not for adults
might decide not to sell such publications in order to avoid possible prosecution involving accidental sales to minors. Due to these damages, the Supreme Court has strictly analyzed any
obscenity statute brought before them. See, e.g., 390 U.S. at 682; Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp.
v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 694-95 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (statutory language cannot
be so vague and loose as to leave too large a power of discretion to those who apply it).
106394 U.S. 557 (1969). During a search of Stanley's home for evidence of bookmaking, the
police found films in his bedroom. The films were viewed and deemed obscene; Stanley was
then arrested and convicted of violating a state obscenity statute. The Supreme Court reversed
this conviction and held that mere possession of obscene material cannot constitute a crime. Id.
at 558-59.
107 Id. at 564. The Stanley Court noted that protection from unwanted intrusions by the
government is a fundamental freedom which takes on added dimensions when it concerns the
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Marshall, held that "the mere private possession of obscene matter
cannot constitutionally be made a crime." 108 Justice Marshall argued
that there was a difference between laws regulating the commercial
dissemination of obscene material and legislation making punishable
the mere private possession of such material. 109 The five man majority maintained that the consenting adult's right to read and receive all
kinds of information, including material lacking in social worth, was
essential for the maintenance of a free society. 110
Although this decision was ostensibly limited to the right of a
consenting adult to enjoy explicit sexual material in the privacy ofethe
home, Justice Marshall provided the foundation for changing the basic rationale of judicial policy by including even obscenity, under certain
circumstances, within the parameters of the first amendment." 1
Moreover, the majority seemed to undermine the underlying assumption of the "prurient interest" element of Roth-Alberts when it de-

privacy of one's home. Thus this right, together with the guarantees of the first amendment,
creates an insurmountable barrier to the enforcement of obscenity laws within the privacy of the
home. Recognition of state power to control what one thinks or reads in his home, the Court
reasoned, would amount to condonation of governmental thought control in its most blatant
form. See id. at 564-65; cf. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (every individual has
right to be free from unwarranted state interference in fundamental private matters such as
decision whether to bear children).
At first, some courts interpreted Stanley as a far-reaching principle which provided an
unqualified right of distribution to willing and competent recipients. See, e.g., United States v.
Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs, 309 F. Supp. 36, 37-38 (C.D. Cal. 1970), rev'd and remanded,
402 U.S. 363, 377 (1971) (federal court invalidated federal obscenity statute and allowed importation of obscene material). However, the ruling in Stanley was significantly curtailed by Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), where the Burger Court upheld a state prohibition against obscene movies in public theatres, noting that the right to possess and view
obscene material is confined to the privacy of the home. Id. at 66-67, 69; see text accompanying
notes 222-29 infra.
The Paris and Stanley rules lead to a dilemma when the individual right to possess obscene
material conflicted with the state's right to proscribe its purchase or distribution. In such a case,
dictum in Stanley indicates that the right to private use outweighs the state's regulatory interests. 394 U.S. at 564. For a discussion of this dilemma, see Katz, Privacy and Pornography:
Stanley v. Georgia, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 203 (1969).
108 394 U.S. at 559. Private possession of obscene material, which is subsumed under the
right to read what one pleases, is recognized as a fundamental element in the constitutional
scheme of individual liberty and as such is protected from state subjugation by the first amendment which is made applicable to the states by the fourteenth. Id. at 568.
109 Id. at 567-68.
110 Id. at 565-66. The Marshall opinion, joined by Chief Justice Warren, and Justices
Douglas, Harlan and Fortas, may have marked the outer limits of a liberal obscenity policy from
which the Burger Court eventually retreated.
"I Id. The prior rationale of the Court had been that obscenity was not included in constitutionally protected speech or press. Roth, 354 U.S. at 485. In Stanley, the Court suddenly
provided an exception to this long-standing rule by allowing obscenity the protection of the first
amendment. The main thrust of this case, however, was not that obscenity is afforded first
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clared that the first amendment prohibited government from either
"protect[ing] the individual's mind from the effects of obscenity" or
"control[ling] the moral content of a person's thoughts." 112 According to Justice Marshall, the state could not formulate obscenity policy
based on some notion of preventing the corruption of individual morals
or harm to the public morality. 113 The only legitimate governmental
concerns, explained the Court, were the protection of non-consenting
adults who had a right to be free from forced exposure to obscenity
and the protection of juveniles. 114
The adoption of a "variable" approach to obscenity, however,
continued to be marked by the same kind of internal disagreement
that had characterized the Warren Court attempts to formulate a
satisfactory test for judging obscenity. The Stanley decision was no
exception. Although the justices had unanimously voted to reverse
the conviction in this case, Justices Black, Stewart, Brennan, and
White all offered reasons that differed from those of the Court's five
5
member majority. "1

C. What the Justices Said and Did: The Final Picture
By the end of the Warren Court period, the justices had still not
agreed on how they or other decision-makers were to determine
whether material was legally obscene. 116 The final positions of the

amendment protection, but that it takes more than obscenity to override the right of privacy.
The Court held that the "ideological content" of the material (e.g., whether or not it is obscene)
is irrelevant because the state cannot enact legislation that results in the control of an individual's thoughts. 394 U.S. at 565-66.
112 394 U.S. at 565.
113 Id. at 566-67.
114

Id. at 567.

115394 U.S. at 568 (Black, J., concurring), 569 (Stewart, J.,joined by Brennan & White, JJ.,
concurring). In his opinion, Justice Black reaffirmed his support of an "absolutists" interpretation of the first amendment, stating that mere possession of obscene material cannot constitute a
crime because of first and fourteenth amendment guarantees. Id. at 568-69 (Black, J., concurring). This position was stated more forcefully in Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463
(1966), where Justice Black said "the Federal Government is without any power whatever under
the constitution to put any type of burden on speech and expression of ideas of any kind." Id. at
476. Justice Stewart, in his opinion in Stanley, argued that it was unnecessary to reach the first
amendment question since the films involved had been seized as part of an illegal search. 394
U.S. at 569 (Stewart, J., concurring). The majority apparently disregarded this threshold issue
in order to present new guidelines on obscenity.
1'6See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (only five-man majority opinion with
two concurrences).
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justices sitting on the bench at the end of the Warren Court period
can be summarized as follows: 117
1. Black and Douglas:.All ideas and material are protected under
the Constitution unless it can be shown that they are so connected
with illegal action as to constitute a clear and present danger to significant societal interests. No special context with respect to commercial exploitation of sex, appeals to sexual deviants, or protection of
juveniles is recognized.' 1 8 Justice Douglas but not Justice Black accepted the special context of personal privacy. 119
2. Stewart: All material is protected under the Constitution with
the exception of "hard-core" pornography. 12 0 No special context with
respect to the commercial exploitation of sex or appeals to sexual deviants is recognized, though a societal interest with respect to chil12 1
dren is recognized.
3. Marshall: Government may regulate the commercial distribution of obscenity to protect juveniles and non-consenting adults. The
special context of personal privacy is recognized. 122
4. Warren, Brennan, and Fortas: Material may be suppressed
whenever prurient appeal, patent offensiveness affronting contemporary community standards, and an utter lack of redeeming social
value coalesce. 123 In determining obscenity, Justices Brennan and
Fortas would use a national community standard 124 while Chief Justice Warren would permit a local community standard. 125 Special
contexts pertaining to the commercial exploitation of sex, appeals to
deviant sexual groups, and the protection of minors are recognized. 126
117 This is an updated and expanded summary of typology first suggested by C. Peter
Magrath. See Magrath, supra note 13, at 56-57.
118 Magrath, supra note 13, at 561; see, e.g., Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 476

(Black, J., dissenting), 482 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (1966); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 196
(Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508 (1957)
(Douglas, J., joined by Black, J., dissenting).
119 See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (Justice Douglas joined majority
and Justice Black wrote concurring opinion).
120 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring); A Quantity of
Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
121 Magrath, supra note 13, at 56; see, e.g., Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 518 (1966)
(Stewart, J., dissenting); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 497 (1966) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
122 See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 563-65 (1969); Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629, 636-43 (1968) (Marshall, J., joined in majority opinion).
122 Magrath, supra note 13, at 57; see, e.g., Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418
(1966).
See, e.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 192-94 (1964).
See, e.g., id. at 199 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
126 See, e.g., Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966); Ginzburg v. United States, 383
U.S. 463 (1966); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 201 (1964)'(Warren, C.J., dissenting).
124
125
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5. White: Material may be suppressed if its dominant appeal,
taken as a whole, appeals to a prurient interest in sex. 127 Special
contexts pertaining to the commercial exploitation of sex, appeals to
deviant sexual groups, and the protection of minors are recognized. 128
6. Harlan: All material is protected under the Constitution at
the federal level with the exception of "hard-core" pornography. At
the state level, material may be regulated if there is reasonable evidence that it appeals to a prurient interest in sex. 1 2 9 No special context with respect to the commercial exploitation of sex at the federal
level is recognized, though appeals to deviant sexual groups at the
of personal privacy is
state level is recognized. The special context
0
accepted at both federal and state levels.13
Although this summary tends to demonstrate the extent of the
internal disagreement on the Warren Court, a somewhat different
perspective emerges when attention is focused directly on what the
justices did by voting to affirm or reverse convictions for obscenity.
When it came to the casting of votes in cases involving the problem
of "drawing the line" between obscene and non-obscene expression, a
majority of Warren Court justices consistently demonstrated a permissive attitude toward the protection of sexually oriented expression.
As can be seen in Table 4 below, the Warren Court generally voted
to uphold the individual's right to freedom of expression over the
governmental power to regulate the dissemination of obscenity.
Table 4 131
Support of Freedom of Expression by
Warren Court in Cases Involving
Constitutional Standard
by Method of
Disposition
Method of Disposition
Decision
Favoring Individual .....
Against Individual .......

Formal

Per Curiam

58.3% (7)
41.7% (5)

97.0%(32)
3.0% (1)

Total ................... 100.0%(12)
127

100.0%(33)

All Cases
86.7% (39)
13.3% (6)
100.0%(45)

Magrath, supra note 13, at 57; Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 460-62 (1966)

(White, J., dissenting).
128 See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 569 (1969) (White, J., joining Stewart, J.,
concurring); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 460 (1966) (White, J., dissenting).
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It should be noted, however, that the level of support for individual
freedom and the protection afforded to sexually oriented material was
considerably higher in cases resolved via the per curiam method than
in cases decided with full written opinions. Indeed, with only one
exception, all decisions against the individual took place in cases rendered by the formal method, 13 2 including many of the so-called
"major" cases, Roth, Alberts, Ginzburg, Mishkin, and Ginsberg.
However, since most of the per curiam decisions came in cases decided after 1966, it does appear that there was a trend of increasing
permissiveness during the latter years of the Warren Court.
Perhaps a better indicator of the extent of the inter-agreement
and permissiveness existing on the high Court can be found in Table
5, where the nine justices sitting at the end of the Warren Court
period are ranked according to their support for individual liberty.
Based on this data, it is clear that these justices demonstrated a re-

129 Magrath, supra note 13, at 56-57; Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 486-92
(1962).
130 See, e.g., Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 493 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting); A
Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 215 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 496 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring).
'31 Favoring Individual-Formal Disposition: Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969);
United Artists Corp. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of
Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Jacobellis v. Ohio,
378 U.S. 184 (1964); Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962); Butler v. Michigan,
352 U.S. 380 (1957).
Against Individual-Formal Disposition: Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968);
Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966);
Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
Favoring Individual-Per Curiam Disposition: Henry v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 655 (1968);
Rabeck v. New York, 391 U.S. 462 (1968); Interstate Circuit Inc., v. City of Dallas, 391 U.S. 53
(1968); City of Dallas v. Interstate Circuit, Inc., 391 U.S. 53 (1968); Felton v. City of Pensacola,
390 U.S. 340 (1968); Robert Arthur Management Corp. v. Tennessee, 389 U.S. 578 (1968); I.M.
Amusement Corp. v. Ohio, 389 U.S. 573 (1968); Chance v. California, 389 U.S. 89 (1967);
Central Magazine Sales, Ltd. v. United States, 389 U.S. 50 (1967); Conner v. City of Hammond, 389 U.S. 48 (1967); Potomac News Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 47 (1967); Schackman
v. California, 388 U.S. 454 (1967); Mazes v. Ohio, 388 U.S. 453 (1967); A Quantity of Copies of
Books v. Kansas, 388 U.S. 452 (1967); Books, Inc. v. United States, 388 U.S. 449 (1967);
Corinth Publications, Inc. v. Wesberry, 388 U.S. 448 (1967); Aday v. United States, 388 U.S.
447 (1967); Avansino v. New York, 388 U.S. 446 (1967); Sheperd v. New York, 388 U.S. 444
(1967); Cobert v. New York, 388 U.S. 443 (1967); Ratner v. California, 388 U.S. 442 (1967);
Friedman v. New York, 388 U.S. 441 (1967); Keney v. New York, 388 U.S. 440 (1967); Gent v.
Arkansas, 386 U.S. 767 (1967); Austin v. Kentucky, 386 U.S. 767 (1967); Redrup v. New York,
386 U.S. 767 (1967); Redmond v. United States, 384 U.S. 264 (1967); Grove Press, Inc. v.
Gerstein, 378 U.S. 577 (1964); Tralins v. Gerstein, 378 U.S. 576 (1964); Sunshine Book Co. v.
Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958); One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958); Mounce v. United
States, 355 U.S. 180 (1957).
Against Individual-Per Curiam Disposition: Landau v. Fording, 388 U.S. 456 (1967).
132 The exception is Landau v. Fording, 388 U.S. 456 (1967).
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support of individual liberty
material. Five of the justices
than ninety per cent of the
individual freedom in at least

Table 5 133
Support of Freedom of Expression by Warren
Court Justices in Cases
Involving Constitutional
Standard
Justice
Hugo Black
William 0. Douglas
Potter Stewart
Abe Fortas
Thurgood Marshall
Byron White
William Brennan, Jr.
Earl Warren
John Marshall Harlan

Favoring
Individual
100.0%
100.0%
97.3%
93.7%
91.7%
80.6%
79.1%
53.8%
31.0%

(43)
(43)
(36)
(30)
(11)
(29)
(34)
(21)
(13)

Favoring
Government
0% (0)
0% (0)
2.8% (1)
6.2% (2)
8.3% (1)
19.4% (7)
20.9% (9)
46.2% (18)
69.0% (29)

Thus, it seems clear that by the end of the Warren Court period
an overwhelming majority of the justices shared similar attitudes with
respect to protecting sexually oriented expression. While the justices
were unable to agree upon a satisfactory test for determining obscenity, there was considerable consensus with respect to the priority of
policy goals or objectives. Eight of the nine justices, for example,
consistently supported freedom of speech over other competing
societal goals. Specifically, most of the justices now rejected an earlier
view that "thought control" was a legitimate societal goal in regulating
obscenity. 134 However, seven of the justices agreed that protecting

133 See note 131 supra.

justices Black and Douglas argued against "'thought control" from the outset. See, e.g.,
J4
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508 (1957) (Douglas, J., joined by Black, J., dissenting).
In the Stanley case, Justice Marshall presented the majority view when he declared: "Whatever
the power of the state to control public dissemination of ideas inimical to the public morality it
cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person's private
thoughts." 394 U.S. at 566. See also Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MICH.
L. IiEv. 219, 229 (1965). In his article, Emerson states:
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sexual expression could be outweighed by two competing societal
goals: safeguarding the sensibilities of individuals who do not wish to
13 5
be exposed to obscenity, and protecting the morality of minors.
Finally, while "thoughts" were deserving of constitutional protections,
illegal "actions" were not. Five of the justices supported the view that
the commercial exploitation of sex, i.e., "pandering," was subject to
governmental regulation. 136
II
THE BURGER COURT AND THE PROBLEM OF OBSCENITY

When Warren Burger became Chief Justice in 1969, he did not
have the votes necessary to change the obscenity policies of the Supreme
Court. 1 3 7 Four years later, however, Chief Justice Burger was successful in mobilizing majority support behind a new approach to the problem of obscenity. Capitalizing on the changes in judicial personnel and
the past pattern of internal disagreement and confusion, the new Chief
Justice emerged as the leader of a five man majority 138 which supported the view that government, especially the national and state
legislatures, should be able to control the dissemination of sexually
oriented material without constant supervision by the Supreme
Court. Toward that end, a majority of the justices discarded the increasingly permissive tests and rationales employed during the Warren Court period, established a new freedom restricting test for determining obscenity, expanded the number of societal goals which
justified restrictions on freedom of expression, and, most recently,
sanctioned the regulation of sexual expression to fulfill other more
important policy objectives.

Protection of [the] private sector-protection, in other words, of the dignity and

integrity of the individual-has become increasingly important as modern society
has developed. All the forces of a technological age-industrialization; urbanization;
and organization-operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusions
into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and totalitarian society.
Emerson, supra at 229.
115Justices Douglas and Black, however, do not place these societal goals above freedom of
expression. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 650 (1968) (Douglas, J., joined by
Black, J., dissenting); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 514-15 (1966) (Black & Douglas, JJ.,
dissenting).
136 See text accompanying notes 122-28 supra.
"' See [Current Term] S. CT. BULL. (CCH) vi-ix.
138 See note 140 infra and accompanying text.
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The change in the Supreme Court's obscenity policy took place
incrementally-in four stages. For the purpose of analysis, these
stages may be conceptualized as follows: stabilization of policy, policy
reversal, innovation and supplementation. 139 To a great extent, each
of these stages appears to correspond to the changes taking place in
judicial personnel. Curbing the expansion of Warren Court policy
(stabilization), for example, was accomplished with the additions of
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Harry Blackmun. Negation of prior
policy and the adoption of a new policy were achieved following
Nixon's appointment of Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist.
Supplementation, the final stage, represents the current position and
reflects the addition of Ford appointee, John Paul Stevens, to the
high court. 140
A. Patterns of Behavior: Institutional Overview
Constant involvement and a high level of internal disagreement
continue to characterize Supreme Court decision-making on obscenity. During the eight year period, 1969-1977, for example, the Burger
Court rendered decisions in twenty-seven obscenity cases, deciding at
least one case in each term. While some of these cases involved procedural issues, the great majority of them (70.4%) raised questions
about freedom of expression and the determination of obscenity. Unlike the Warren Court period, however, a majority of these cases
were resolved through the formal written opinion method. A summary of the Burger Court's output in this policy area and the method
141
used to resolve these cases is found in Table 6 below.

Table 6 142
Summary of Decisions on the Merits Made by the
Burger Court in Obscenity Cases by
Method of Disposition
Method of Disposition
Obscenity Case
Classification
Constitutional Standard .
Procedural Safeguards ...
Totals ...................

Formal

Per Curiam

Totals

16
5

7
3

23
8

21

10

31
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In addition, the present Court has made extensive use of "memorandum orders," that is, unsigned statements usually denying writs of
143
certiorari or dismissing cases on appeal.
In addition to what appears to be a preoccupation with the problem of obscenity, a high level of internal disagreement continues to
exist on the Burger Court. As can be seen in Table 7 below, the
record of the Burger Court with respect to internal consistency is not
unlike that of the Warren Court. More than four out of every five
cases were resolved in non-unanimous decisions, although Burger
Court decisions were often closer than Warren Court decisions.
Table 7 144
Unanimity in Obscenity Cases Decided by the
Burger Court by Method of Disposition
Method of Disposition
Decision

Formal

Per Curiam

Split ................................
Unanimous ........................

93.75% (15)
6.25% (1)

71.4% (5)
28.6% (2)

Totals ..........................

100.0% (16)

100.0% (7)

139 These stages correspond to what appears to be a norm in policy development. As Martin
Shapiro has noted, "'t]he prototype of American domestic policy-making, at least since the New
Deal, has been innovation followed by supplementation." Shapiro, Obscenity Law: A Public
Policy Analysis, 20 J. PUB. L. 503, 503 (1971).
140 For a statement on the Justice's appointment to the Court, see [Current Term] S. CT.
BULL. (CCH) vi-ix.

141Tables 6 and 7 do not include two cases which were decided by an equally divided court
via per curiam opinions. See Grove Press v. Maryland State Bd. of Censors, 401 U.S. 480
(1971); Radich v. New York, 401 U.S. 531 (1971). Justice Douglas did not participate in either
case. Data in all tables reflect cases decided through January 1, 1978.
142 Constitutional Standard-Formal Disposition: Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767 (1977);
Splawn v. California, 431 U.S. 595 (1977); Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977); Marks
v. United States, 430 U.S. 788 (1977); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50
(1976); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153
(1974); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974); United States v. ONto, 413 U.S. 139
(1973); United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973); Kaplan v. California, 413
U.S. 115 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972); United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971). Constitutional
Standard-Per Curiam Disposition: Papish v. University of Missouri, 410 U.S. 667 (1973); Kois
v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972); Hoyt v. Minnesota, 399 U.S. 524 (1970); Walker v. Ohio,
398 U.S. 434 (1970); Bloss v. Dykema, 398 U.S. 278 (1970); Gable v. Jenkins, 397 U.S. 592
(1970); Cain v. Kentucky, 397 U.S. 319 (1970). Procedural Safeguards-Formal Method:
McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669 (1976); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S.
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While the Warren Court seldom divided five-to-four, the Burger
Court divided five-to-four in almost three-fourths (11 of 15) of the
non-unanimous cases decided with full written opinion. In all but one
of these cases, the justices seemed to form two distinct blocs: the four
Nixon appointees and Justice White voting as a majority and Justices
Brennan, Marshall, Douglas, and Stewart voting in the minority. 145
As was the case during the prior period, some Burger Court justices were more active than others in these fifteen non-unanimous
decisions. In contrast to the rather passive role taken by Earl
Warren, Chief Justice Burger wrote most of the majority opinions,
especially in the pre-1974 period. 146 As Table 8 helps illustrate,
Justices Brennan and Douglas wrote the most dissents. Justice Douglas was also the most prolific, writing eight opinions in the ten nonunanimous cases in which he was a participant.

546 (1975); Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971); United States v. The Book Bin, 400 U.S. 410
(1971); Rowan v. Post Office Department, 397 U.S. 728 (1970). Procedural Safeguards-Per
Curiam: Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313 (1972); Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971);
Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971).
143 During the 1975-1976 term, for example, "Memorandum Orders" were reported in
twelve obscenity cases. Generally, these cases involved a denial of review through certiorari by
a six-to-three vote. Only Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stewart consistently voted to grant
certiorari and reverse a lower court's conviction.
I" Split Decision-Formal Dispostion: Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767 (1977); Splawn v.
California, 431 U.S. 595 (1977); Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977); Marks v. United
States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976);
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87
(1974); United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973); United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film,
413 U.S. 123 (1973); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109
(1972); United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971); United States v.
Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971). Unanimous Decision-Formal Disposition: Jenkins v. Georgia, 418
U.S. 153 (1974). Split Decision-Per Curiam Disposition: Hoyt v. Minnesota, 399 U.S. 524
(1970); Walker v. Ohio, 398 U.S. 434 (1970); Bloss v. Dykema, 398 U.S. 278 (1970); Gable v.
Jenkins, 397 U.S. 592 (1970); Cain v. Kentucky, 397 U.S. 319 (1970). Unanimous DecisionPer Curiam Dispostion: Papish v. University of Missouri, 410 U.S. 667 (1973); Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972).
14 The exception is the recent decision in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S.
50 (1976). Here, the majority consisted of Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist,
White, and Stevens. The dissenters were Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun.
Id. at 51.
146 Justice Burger's deference for local autonomy gained majority support in Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). This policy was based upon the belief that the size and diversity
of the United States precluded the formulation of an obscenity standard that would satisfy all
fifty states. Id. at 30-34. For a discussion of the Miller opinion, see text accompanying notes
191-224 infra. Cf. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974) (nothing in Constitution requires "the standards of a hypothetical statewide community" be applied by juries in state
obscenity cases).
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Table 8 147
Summary of Written Opinions Submitted in
Obscenity Cases Decided by Formal
Method of Disposition by
Individual Justice
Justices of Burger Court

Written
Opinions
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t
Majority ........
Judgment of
Court .......
Concurring .....
Dissenting .....
Total .......

Total

0

1

0 5

0

0

0

2

1

0

3

3

15

0
0
2

0 0 0
0 1 0
1 10 1

0
1
7

0
2
0

0
1
2

0
1
0

0
1
3

0
2
2

0
0
0

1
0
1

1
9
29

2

2

8

2

3

3

5

4

3

5

54

11 6

From a comparative perspective, the justices sitting on the Burger
Court submitted more majority opinions, fewer concurring opinions
and judgments of the Court, and more dissenting opinions in approximately an equal number of non-unanimous cases.
B. What the Justices Said
I: Stabilization
Shortly after his appointment, Chief Justice Warren Burger indicated that he was opposed to the Warren Court's handling of the
problem of obscenity. The major thrust of his disagreement was directed at the lack of deference shown by the Supreme Court to the
judgments made by decision-making agencies at the state level. In
Cain v. Kentucky, 148 for example, Chief Justice Burger dissented
from the Court's per curiam reversal of that state's decision to ban

147
148

For the cases forming the basis for this table, see note 144 supra.
397 U.S. 319 (1970).
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the public showing of the film I, A Woman. 149 In his view, the Court
"should not inflexibly deny to each of the states the power to adopt
and enforce its own standards as to obscenity." 150 A similar view was
expressed in the Walker v. Ohio 151 case where Chief Justice Burger,
in objecting to yet another per curiam reversal of a state court's finding of obscenity, declared that he could find no justification for the
high Court's "assuming the role of a supreme and unreviewable board
of censorship for the 50 States, subjectively judging each piece of
material brought before it without regard to the findings or conclusions of other courts, state or federal." 152
The Burger position was not a new one. John Marshall Harlan
had consistently advocated this view, at least in state obscenity
cases. 153 This viewpoint soon gained the support of a third justice
when Justice Blackmun, the second Nixon appointee, announced in
Hoyt v. Minnesota 154 that he found himself "generally in accord"
with the Burger-Harlan position. 155 "I am not persuaded," explained
Justice Blackmun in dissent, "that the First and Fourteenth Amendments
necessarily prescribe a national and uniform measure-rather than
one capable of some flexibility and resting on concepts of
reasonableness-of what each of our several States constitutionally
may do to regulate obscene products within its borders." 156
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Harlan and Blackmun were especially upset over the majority's continued use of the summary per
149 Justices Burger and Harlan voted to aflrm in Caine. 397 U.S. at 319-20 (Burger, C.J.,

dissenting) (Harlan, J.,dissenting). Justices Douglas, Black, Brennan, Stewart, White, and Marshall voted for reversal. See id. at 319.
150397 U.S. at 319 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
151 398 U.S. 434 (1970).

152Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The justices, with the exception of Marshall, voted along
the same lines as they had in the Caine case. See id.
153See, e.g., Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 458-60 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (although Constitution requires state obscenity laws be rationally related to "accepted notions of
obscenity," local traditions, varying moral standards, and disparate conditions across country
necessitate establishment of state standards for defining obscenity); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S.

184, 203-04 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (although federal obscenity statutes should be
examined under Roth test, states' statutes should be examined under test of rationality which
would permit states to ban material which "has been reasonably found in state judicial proceedings to treat with sex in fundamentally offensive manner, under rationally established criteria for
judging such nmaterial"); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 503-08 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (there is no danger to first amendment guarantees in allowing states, who are charged with
"direct responsibility for the protection of the local moral fabric," to suppress borderline material, so long as federal regulation is limited to hard-core pornography).
154 399 U.S. 524 (1970).
155Id.

at 525.

156 Id. at 524. Justices Douglas, Black, Brennan, Stewart, White and Marshall held for summary reversal. See id.
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curiam method to overturn lower courts which had conscientiously
attempted to apply Supreme Court standards. 15 7 "I cannot agree,"
stated Justice Blackmun, "that the Minnesota trial court and those six
justices [on the Minnesota supreme court] were so obviously misguided in their holding that they are to be summarily reversed on the
authority of Redrup." 158
Additional support for the Supreme Court's new position of deference to state obscenity policy emerged in several other per curiam
decisions, two of which were resolved by an equally divided Court.
In these latter cases, the Court affirmed findings of obscenity regarding the showing of the film I Am Curious Yellow 159 and the displaying of a sculptor's representation of the American flag as a phallus. 160
Although it is not possible to identify authoritatively the division
of the Court in these four-to-four decisions, it seems probable
that the four aflirmative votes were cast by the Chief Justice and
Justices Blackmun, Harlan, and White. Thus, the new policy of def157 Id. at 524-25. The summary per curiam method of reversal began in Redrup v. New
York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967). Faced with a continuing divergence of opinions over the question of
obscenity, the Court resorted to this practice whenever five members of the Court determined
the material not to be obscene, using their own separate tests. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49, 82-83 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Since Redrup, "no fewer than [thirty-one]
cases.have been disposed of in this fashion." Id. at 82 n.8; see, e.g., Bloss v. Michigan, 402
U.S. 938 (1971); Childs v. Oregon, 401 U.S. 1006 (1971); Walker v. Ohio, 398 U.S. 434 (1970);
Hoyt v. Minnesota, 399 U.S. 524 (1970); Bloss v. Dykema, 398 U.S. 278 (1970); Caine v.
Kentucky, 397 U.S. 319 (1970); Carlos v. New York, 396 U.S. 119"(1969); Henry v. Louisiana,
392 U.S. 655 (1968); Felton v. Pensacola, 390 U.S. 340 (1968); Robert Arthur Management
Corp. v. Tennessee ex rel. Canale, 389 U.S. 578 (1968); I.M. Amusement Corp. v. Ohio, 389
U.S. 573 (1968); Chance v. California, 389 U.S. 89 (1967); Central Magazine Sales, Ltd. v. United
States, 389 U.S. 60 (1967); Conner v. City of Hammond, 389 U.S. 48 (1967); Potomac News Co.
v. United States, 389 U.S. 47 (1967); Schackman v. California, 388 U.S. 454 (1967); Mazes v.
Ohio, 388 U.S. 453 (1967); A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 388 U.S. 452 (1967);
Books, Inc. v. United States, 388 U.S. 449 (1967); Aday v. United States, 388 U.S. 477 (1967);
Avansino v. New York, 388 U.S. 446 (1967); Sheperd v. New York, 388 U.S. 444 (1967); Cobert
v. New York, 388 U.S. 443 (1967); Ratner v. California, 388 U.S. 442 (1967); Friedman v. New
York, 388 U.S. 441 (1967); Keney v. New York, 388 U.S. 440 (1967).
158 399 U.S. at 524-25 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
159 Grove Press v. Maryland St. Bd. of Censors, 401 U.S. 480 (1971); Radich v. New York,
401 U.S. 531 (1971). For a discussion of these cases, see notes 160-62 infra and accompanying
text. In Grove Press, the finding of obscenity rested on a determination that the film appealed
to prurient interests, that it described sex beyond the limits of candor, and that it was without
any social redeeming value. Wagnheim v. Maryland St. Bd. of Censors, 255 Md. 297, 297, 258
A.2d 240, 241 (1969), aff'd sub nom. Grove Press v. Maryland St. Bd. of Censors, 401 U.S. 480
(1971).
160 Radich v. New York, 401 U.S. 531 (1971). The defendant was convicted of violating a
New York flag desecration statute when, as a protest against the Vietnam war, he created a
sculpture which depicted the American flag enwrapping a phallic symbol, as a human body
hanging from a noose, and as a gun caisson. People v. Radish, 26 N.Y.2d 114, 117, 257 N.E.2d
30, 31, 308 N.Y.S. 2d 846, 847-48 (N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 531 (1971).
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erence now commanded the support of four justices, the two Nixon
appointees and two holdovers from the Warren Court period. Of the
four, only Justice White had strongly supported freedom of expres16 1
sion by voting to overturn lower court convictions for obscenity.
The policy of deference, however, was not intended to apply to
lower courts that supported freedom of expression against governmental restraint. The emerging Burger Court was to deal harshly
with lower courts that sought to build upon the permissive policy
articulated by the Warren Court in Stanley. 162 While the justices
favoring a more restrictive approach still lacked the votes to establish
a new policy, they were successful in achieving "stabilization" in policy, that is, the halting of any further development of permissive
Warren Court obscenity policy. This stabilization was accomplished in
the 1971 decision of United States v. Reidel 163 and United States v.
Thirty-Seven Photographs164 where the Court disagreed with lower
federal courts and limited the applicability of Stanley, supported convictions under two federal obscenity statutes, and reaffirmed the traditional view that obscenity was not entitled to the protection of the
65
first amendment. 1
What is most surprising about Reidel is the extent of the support
for limiting the scope of Stanley and affirming allegiance to the
Roth-Alberts rationale. All but two of the Justices (Black and Douglas)
agreed that the federal obscenity statute was constitutional as applied
to the use of the mails for the distribution of explicit sexual material
to willing adult recipients. 166 Speaking for the majority, Justice
White declared that Stanley "neither overruled nor disturbed the

161 See Table 5 in text supra and accompanying note.
162See, e.g., United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 141-42 (1973); United States v. 12 200Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 126-29 (1973).

16 402 U.S. 351 (1971). Norman Reidel was indicted under a federal obscenity statute for
mailing a pornographic book which was solicited and paid for by a postal inspector. Id. at
353. Citing Stanley, the district court held the statute to be unconstitutional, when applied to
consenting adults, by reasoning that if a person has the right to receive and possess material in
the privacy of his home, then someone else must necessarily have the right to deliver it to him.
Id. at 355.
164 Id. at 363. Customs agents, acting under federal law, seized thirty-seven photo-

graphs from a United States citizen who was returning from abroad. Id. at 365-66. The
district court held the federal statute to be unconstitutional because it permitted the forfeiture
of obscene material destined for private use contrary to Stanley. United States v. Thirty-Seven
Photographs, 309 F. Supp. 36 (C.D. Cal. 1970), rev'd, 402 U.S. 363 (1971).
'6
See United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. at 354-57; United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. at 375-77.
16 402 U.S. at 352.
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holding in Roth." 167 The district court had erred in two important
respects. First, it did not recognize that Stanley was not so much an
obscenity case as it was a case involving the right of privacy-the
freedom to think, fantasize, and read in one's own home without fear
of governmental intrusion. Second, the lower court had failed to
comprehend that these two cases involved fundamentally different
constitutional questions. The private possession of explicit sexual
material was an issue in Stanley but not in Roth, while the commercial distribution of obscenity through the mails was involved in Roth
but not in Stanley. 168 While the majority acknowledged that Stanley
had identified a "right to receive" sexual material, 1 6 9 the justices
maintained that such a right "is not so broad as to immunize the
dealing in obscenity in which Reidel engaged here-dealings which
Roth held unprotected by the First Amendment." 170 Unfortunately,
the majority did not explain how a consenting adult, sitting in the
privacy of his own home, could exercise this "right to receive" when
disseminators of obscenity had no concomitant right to send such
material through the mail. Only dissenting Justices Black and Douglas
addressed themselves to this incongruity, arguing that a person who
had a constitutional right to possess obscene material in the privacy of
the home also had a right to receive such material "voluntarily"
1 71
through the mail.
167 Id. at 354. Justice White's majority opinion was supported by an unusual mixture of
conservatives (Chief Justice Burger, Justices Blackmun and Harlan) and liberals (Justices
Brennan and Stewart). Justice Harlan concurred, while Justice Marshall concurred in part and
dissented in part. Id. at 357-62.
168 See id. at 354-55. Feeling that "[tihe District Court gave Stanley too wide a sweep,"
Justice White indicated that the right to possess obscene material in private, enunciated in
Stanley, could not encompass the right to sell such material, because such an extrapolation
would contradict Roth, something which Stanley never intended to do. Id. at 355. But cf.
Griswold v..Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (since use of contraceptives is protected by constitutional right of privacy, state may not prevent doctor from supplying means by which one
engages in such protected activity).
169 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. at 564. Justice Marshall characterized the right to receive
ideas and information irrespective of any social value as "fundamental to our free society." Id.;
cf. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968) (fundamental right may only be abridged upon
showing compelling reason). See generally Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a
Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 45 (1974).
170 402 U.S. at 355. But cf. Karalexis v. Byrne, 306 F. Supp. 1363, 1365-68 (D. Mass. 1969),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971) (preliminary
injunction granted against future prosecutions for exhibiting obscene movies to paying public on
grounds that nlaterial was not pandered, its offensive nature was clearly indicated to viewing
public, and minors were excluded from theatre).
171402 U.S. at 381. Surprisingly, Justice Marshall did not view the majority opinion as an
attack on Stanley. In his concurring opinion, he argued that Reidel's activities were not protected under the Stanley policy since the appellee had not done enough to insure that his
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The scope of the Stanley policy was also raised in the ThirtySeven Photographs case. 172 This time, however, only four of the justices voted to reverse a lower court's view that an individual had a
right to import obscene material for perusal in the privacy of his
home. 1 73 In presenting the plurality position, Justice White argued
that the Stanley policy was not applicable to the case at hand. According to Justice White:
That the private user under Stanley may not be prosecuted for
possession of obscenity in his home does not mean that he is entitled to import it from abroad free from the power of Congress to
exclude noxious articles from commerce. Stanley's emphasis was on
the freedom of thought and mind in the privacy of the home. But a
port of entry is not a traveler's home. . . . Whatever the scope of
the right to receive obscenity . . . that right . . . does not extend

to one seeking to import obscene materials from abroad whether
74
for private use or public distribution.1

Protest against this emasculation of Stanley was widespread. Justices Marshall, Stewart, Black, and Douglas all agreed that the plurality had presented no plausible reason to distinguish the private possession of obscene material which was protected under Stanley from
the importation of obscenity for purely private use. 175 Justice
Marshall, for example, argued that it was "disingenuous to contend
that Stanley's conviction was reversed because his home, rather than
his person or luggage, was the locus of the search." 176 The purpose
merchandise did not fall into the hands of minors. Id. at 361-62 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Justice Marshall's position, however, is not entirely convincing, for Reidel had required potential buyers of his material to declare their age. Without elaboration however, Justice Marshall
declared that this was not enough. Id. at 361 (Marshall, J., concurring).
172 402 U.S. at 376. Although the "right to receive" issue was considered, this case also
involved a lower court's determination that the federal importation of obscenity statute was
unconstitutional for failing to meet the procedural requirements set forth in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). 402 U.S. at 366-67. A majority of the Justices (White, Burger, Harlan,
Brennan, Stewart, and Blackmun) rejected this view, finding that the statute could be judicially
construed to provide the kind of prompt judicial determination of obscenity that was required
under Freedman. Id. at 373-75.
173 402 U.S. at 365. The plurality consisted of Justices White, Burger, Blackmun, and
Brennan. Justices Harlan and Stewart filed concurring opinions while Justice Black, joined by
Justices Douglas and Marshall, dissented. Id. at 377-88.
174Id. at 376.
175 Id. at 379, 381; cf. United States v. Articles of Obscene Merchandise, 315 F. Supp.
191,
195-96 (S.D.N.Y.) (proscription against importation of obscene material for private use held
constitutional).
176 402 U.S. at 360. In limiting the application of societal interest, the Court in
Stanley
rejected three such interests as inappropriate in the context of private possession: (1) the moral
health of the community was rejected as a form of thought control; (2) the prevention of sexual
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of Stanley, explained its author, was to limit the number'of societal
interests which could be used to justify a regulatory policy.177 Since
the items in this case were in the respondent's private possession
with no threat to either minors or non-consenting adults, Justice Marshall concluded that the imported photographs were entitled to constitutional protection. 178
Justice Stewart expressed a similar view. While he agreed that
the first amendment did not prohibit the border seizure of obscene
material destined for commercial distribution, he also argued that the
Constitution did not permit a policy of seizing materials intended for
the purely private use of the importer. 179 "If the Government can
constitutionally take the book away from him as he passes through
customs," stated Justice Stewart, "then I do not understand the meaning of
Stanley." 180
Justices Black and Douglas presented the strongest condemnation of the plurality opinion. In their view, the plurality was "bowing
to popular passions" and attempting to overrule the Stanley policy.' 8 1 This policy has been so limited, wrote Justice Black, that it is
apparently only applicable when "[a] man writes salacious books in his
attic, prints them in his basement, and reads them in his living room." 182
During the 1971-1972 term, the number of supporters of a permissive obscenity policy were further reduced. Justice Black, one
of the strongest defenders of freedom of sexual expression, had been
replaced by former American Bar Association president Lewis Powell.
In addition, the generally conservative (though not in federal cases)
John Marshall Harlan had been succeeded by William Rehnquist, a

misconduct resulting from the exposure to obscene material was dismissed for the failure to
show any empirical connection between obscenity and sexual deviance; and (3) the need to
facilitate the enforcement of laws against the distribution by proscribing possession was rejected
in the face of the first amendment and the right to privacy. 394 U.S. at 565-68.
177

Id.

402 U.S. at 360-61. Constitutional protection might end, explained Justice Marshall, if
and when commercial distribution takes place. Id. at 361.
179 Id. at 379 (Stewart, J., concurring). But see United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film,
413 U.S. 123, 128 (1973) (Stanley protects privacy of home, but does not permit importation of
obscene material, even for strictly private use).
178

180 402 U.S. at 379.
181 Id. at 382.
.82 Id. Taken together, Reidel and Thirty-Seven Photographs indicate how mistaken some
commentators were regarding the likely impact of the Stanley policy. In his extensive study of
Stanley, for example, Professor Katz argued that the Court had "clearly enervated the Roth
doctrine, for the privacy approach affords a distinction that, of necessity, severely limits Roth's
ken . . . Stanley may well prove a classic example of destruction by distinction." See Katz,
Privacy and Pornography: Stanley v. Georgia, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 204.
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conservative. 1 83 'The Supreme Court now seemed ready to move
beyond the stabilization of policy stage.
An early indication of future Burger Court policy can be found in
Kois v. Wisconsin,1 4 the first obscenity case decided with the participation of all four Nixon appointees. In this case, the justices overturned a conviction for the publication of a sex poem in an underground newspaper. 185 The justices maintained that the poem's content
and placement within the newspaper "bears some of the earmarks
of an attempt at serious art." 186 One year later, seriousness of
purpose replaced "utterly without redeeming social value" in the
87
Burger Court's reformulation of the Roth-Alberts test. 1
II: Reversal and Innovation
On June 21, 1973, sixteen years after the historic Roth-Alberts
decision, Chief Justice Burger announced that a majority of the justices had now reached agreement on a new and comprehensive approach to the problem of obscenity. 188 The new policy was set forth
in five separate cases,1 89 all decided by five-to-four votes, and it in183 See [Current Term] S. CT. BULL. (CCH) vi-ix.
18 408 U.S. 229 (1972).
185 Id. at 232.
186 Id. at 231. In reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court relied on Thornhill v.

Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), for the proposition that '" 'freedom of speech and of the press
guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully
all matters of public concern without fear of restraint or of subsequent punishment.' " 408 U.S.
at 230. The petitioner's poem in Kois was found to be within the protection afforded freedom of
expression along with the accompanying pictures, since they were rationally related to the article. Id. at 231.
187 In another per curiam opinion involving the contents of an underground newspaper, six of
the justices voted to reverse a lower court's decision upholding the suspension of a campus
reporter who had violated university regulations pertaining to "indecent conduct and speech."
Papish v. University of Missouri, 410 U.S. 667, 667-78 (1973). The majority felt that the publication of a political cartoon depicting the raping of the Statue of Liberty by policemen and an
article concerning a campus organization called "The Motherfuckers" was constitutionally protected. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, joined by Burger and Blackmun dissented.
Id. at 671-78.
'" Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 29 (1973). Chief Justice Burger stated that the practice
of issuing unelaborated per curiam decisions utilized consistently since Redrup, had come to an
end, and that the Miller Court would "attempt to provide positive guidance to federal and state
courts." 413 U.S. at 29.
"I See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36-37 (1973) (state may prosecute distribution of
obscene material mailed to unwilling recipients); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49,
57 (1973) (state may suppress showing of obscene films to consenting adults); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119-20 (1973) (mere words, without accompanying illustrations, can constitute obscenity); United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 128 (1973) (federal
government can proscribe importation of obscene material intended purely for personal use);
United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 143-44 (1973) (federal government can restrict interstate
transportation of obscene material).
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eluded three key elements: the rejection of the permissive standards
and rationales employed prior to the Burger Courtq the establishment
of a freedom-restricting test for determining obscenity, and the continuation of a deferential attitude toward state regulatory policies on
obscenity. Specifically, the four Nixon appointees along with Justice
White agreed to reaffirm obscenity's exclusion from first amendment
protection, 190 to discard the permissive Memoirs test, 19 1 to accept
"public morality" as a legitimate societal interest for regulating
obscenity, 19 2 to extend the coverage of the obscenity test to nonillustrated sexual books, 193 and to limit further the "right to receive"
concept by denying constitutional protection to sexual material dis1 94
seminated solely to consenting adults.
This reversal of past policy and the establishment of a new approach to obscenity was first announced in Miller v.. California.195
Although this case could have been easily resolved on the basis of
prior Warren Court decisions protecting the sensibilities of nonconsenting adults and juveniles, 19 6 the new majority evinced no intention of adhering to the strictures of judicial restraint. Instead, the
justices acknowledged a broader objective-to facilitate the regulation of obscenity by replacing liberal Warren Court policies with
"standards more concrete than those in the past." 19'7 The Miller
case
seemed to be a most appropriate vehicle for accomplishing this objective: it involved a statute 198 which incorporated the permissive
The Chief Justice wrote the majority opinion in all five cases and was joined by Justices
Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist and White. Separate dissents were filed by Justices Douglas and
Brennan (who were joined by Stewart and Marshall).
190 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
191 Id. at 24-25.
192 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 44, 57-60 (1973). "[T]here is a 'right of the

Nation and of the States to maintain a decent society.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964)).

Id. at 59-60 (quoting Jacobellis v.

191Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, "119 (1973).
194Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68 (1973).
195 413 U.S.

15 (1973).

'9 Since advertising brochures depicting sexual activites had been sent to an unwilling recipient, the majority could have relied on previously established policies. See, e.g., Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. at 567 (possibility of intrusion upon privacy of general public is legitimate
objection to public distribution of obscene material).
197 413 U.S. at 20.

198The California statute, in pertinent part, stated:
-Obscene" means that to the average person, applying contemporary standards, the
predominant appeal of the matter, taken as a whole, is to prurient interest, i.e., a
shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, which goes substantially
beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters
and is matter which is utterly without redeeming social importance.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 311 (a) (West 1970).
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Memoirs test while authorizing the use of a statewide, rather than
national, community standard. 199
Of course, the Burger Court did not seek to overturn all Warren
Court policy. Policies which could generate convictions under national and state obscenity laws were given strong support. Thus, the
justices gave effusive praise to the Warren Court's original pronouncement in Roth-Alberts. 200 What the justices could not support,
however, was the reformulation of Roth-Alberts in Memoirs 201
where, according to the Chief Justice, the Court "veered sharply
away" from its initial policy. 20 2 In Chief Justice Burger's view, the
Memoirs reformulation made it much more difficult to obtain convictions because, unlike Roth-Alberts, which merely presumed obscenity
was lacking in social value, it required an independent and affirmative
determination that the material was "utterly without redeeming social
value." 203 And since almost all expression has some minimal level of
social value, the Chief Justice only slightly overstated his case when
he said that the social value element made it "virtually impossible" to
prove obscenity. 20 4 Thus, the "redeeming social value" criterion had
to be abandoned.
In place of the discredited Memoirs standard, the five justice
majority in Miller proposed the following new tripartite test for determining obscenity:
(a) whether the average person applying contemporary standards
would find that the work taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest . .. (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, 20 5 sexual conduct specifically defined by the
199 413 U.S. at 31.
200

For a discussion of the Roth test of obscenity, see notes 22-51 supra and accompanying

text.
201 For a statement of that reformulation, see Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. at 418,
and text accompanying notes 62-67 supra.

202 413 U.S. at 21.

Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 22. According to Chief Justice Burger, the Memoirs standard represented "a
drastically altered test that called on the prosecution to prove a negative, i.e., that the material
was 'utterly without redeeming social value'-a burden virtually impossible to discharge under
our criminal standards of proof." Id.
20' "Patently offensive" material was defined as that material which "goes substantially
beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters." 413 U.S. at
17 n.1; see, e.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974) (nudity alone cannot satisfy the
standard of "patently offensive").
The "patently offensive" test for obscenity originated in Justice Harlan's opinion in Manual
Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 486 (1962) (phrase used to describe "hard-core" pornography). For a discussion of the changing interpretations of the "patently offensive" standard in
the obscenity cases between Manual Enterprises and Miller, see Note, 18 ST. Louis U.L.J.
203

204
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applicable state law, 20 6 and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole,
20 7
lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.

All three parts must coalesce for a finding of obscenity.2 0 8 Thus, a
patently offensive and prurient work could still be brought within the
protection of the first amendment if one of the specified "serious"
20 9
values was present.
Despite assurances that this new standard was not, as the dissenters maintained, "repressive," there can be little doubt that the justices desired to impose significant restrictions on the dissemination of
sexual material. 2 1 0 Although the Chief Justice stated that the new
test was applicable only to hard-core pornography 2 1 his description
of patently offensive sexual conduct covers the kinds of activities that
routinely were given constitutional protection during the Warren
297, 308-09 (1973). See also Leventhal, The 1973 Round of Obscenity-PornographyDecisions,
59 A.B.A.J. 1261, 1263 (1973) (noting that words "taken as a whole" are deleted from Miller test
for patent offensiveness without any explanation by Court).
206 Only representations of physical conduct, rather than mere expression, may be deemed
obscene under the Miller test. 413 U.S. at 24-26. The sexual conduct may be defined either in
the statute itself or through judicial construction. Id. at 24; see, e.g., Gibbs v. State, 255 Ark.
997, 1006, 504 S.W.2d 719, 724 (1974) (court sustained Arkansas statute which did not specifically define "patently offensive" conduct because such definition had been provided by judicial
interpretation of statute).
207 413 U.S. at 24. See also Note, 40 BROOKLYN L. REV. 442, 450 (1973) (Miller Court failed
to clarify degree of seriousness required). One commentator suggests that the reason the Miller
Court adopted the new "serious value" test lies in the Court's acceptance of the Meiklejohn
model of the first amendment. This model contends that the first amendment does not protect
the private right of speech but, rather, protects only that speech which contributes to the ability
of citizens to govern themselves, i.e., all speech relevant to an issue which the voters must
decide. Comment, In Quest of a "Decent Society": Obscenity and the Burger Court, 49 WASH.
L. REV. 89, 123-28 (1973). But see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU'IONAL Law §§ 12-16, at
668-69 (1978) (arguing that Court is, in fact, guilty of cultural discrimination).
208 413 U.S. at 24-25; see Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. at 191 (balancing of elements of
obscenity test is not permitted).
209 Chief Justice Burger does not indicate whether his listing of "serious" (at one point he
says "genuinely serious") values is meant to be exhaustive. It is not clear, for example, whether
a serious sex education manual or what one commentator calls "a hilarious movie on mishaps in
a nudist camp" would fit into one of the Court's categories. See Levanthal, supra note 205, at
1264-65.
210 As Justice Powell has recently stated, "[c]learly it was thought that some conduct which
would have gone unpunished under Memoirs would result in convictions under Miller." Marks
v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 194 (1977).
211 413 U.S. at 27. The Miller test limited obscenity to "representations or descriptions of
ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated" or "of masturbation, excretory
functions and lewd exhibition of the genitals." Id. at 25; see, e.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S.
153, 161 (1974) (film Carnal Knowledge not obscene despite fact that "ultimate sexual acts" are
depicted because the camera does not focus on the actors' bodies during those scenes). But cf.
Comment, Obscenity: A Step Forward by a Step Back?, 38 ALBANY L. REv. 764, 782 (1974)
(contending that Court's reference to "hard core" pornography caused Miller test to be unclear);
Note, 33 MD. L. REV. 421, 444-45 (1973) (same).
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Court period. 212 Even more telling is Chief Justice Burger's explanation of how the new test would operate with respect to questionable
material. In his view, a textbook on human anatomy could be constitutionally "saved" thanks to serious scientific value. 2 13 If a medical
textbook represents "borderline" type material in terms of prurience
and patent offensiveness, then it follows that a great deal of all sexual
material could be viewed as being obscene under the Court's new
standard.
In addition to narrowing the boundaries surrounding constitutionally protected sexual material, the justices claimed their new approach would bring greater clarity and certainty to the law of obscenity. 214 Clearly, the emphasis on sexual conduct and the inclusion of
an illustrative "model" state statute would appear to do this. 2 15 However, it is extremely difficult to see how the substitution of "serious
value" for "redeeming social value" was likely to produce greater certainty in the law. As in the past, this would seem to be a matter
primarily for a jury to decide. 2 1 6 Yet, as Chief Justice Burger concedes, juries sitting in different parts of the country are likely, as they
have in the past, to reach contrary judgments on the same material. 217
There is one part of the Court's test which seems deliberately
designed to produce greater uncertainty. This is the new interpretation that was given to the "contemporary community standards" element of the obscenity test. Although a majority of the Warren Court
justices had never specifically embraced the use of a "national" standard, many of those charged with applying the Court's test seemed to
See notes 76-83 supra and accompanying text.
413 U.S. at 26.
214 Id. at 29. But see Note, Obscenity--United States Supreme Court Adopts a New Test, 18
ST. LOuis U.L.J. 297, 317 (1973) (raising number of questions left in wake of Miller decision).
215 Despite a disclaimer that the judiciary was precluded from proposing regulatory schemes
for legislatures, Chief Justice Burger provided the following examples of what might be proscribed: "(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or
perverted, actual or simulated. (b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibitions of the genitals." 413 U.S. at 25. The Court's
suggestions did not go unheeded. After this decision, more than 150 anti-pornography bills were
introduced in 38 of the 44 legislatures in regular session during 1973-1974. See Pilpel & Parsons, Dirty Business in Court, 1 Civ. LIB. REV. 30, 32 (1974).
216 For a discussion of the role that expert testimony is to play in helping juries reach determinations on obscenity, see Paris Theatre 1, 413 U.S. at 56; McGaffey, A Realistic Look at
Expert Witnesses in Obscenity Cases, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 218 (1974).
217 413 U.S. at 26 n.4. Chief Justice Burger addressed himself to this phenomena by responding that "[tihe mere fact juries may reach different conclusions as to the same material
does not mean that constitutional rights are abridged." Id. But see Comment, 28 ARK. L. REV.
357, 370 (1974) (discussing difficulties of appellate review in absence of recorded testimony by
experts as to applicable "'contemporarycommunity standards of prurient appeal").
212
213
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assume that such a standard should be used. 2 18 The Burger Court
justices, however, would have nothing to do with a "national" standard which they viewed as being "unascertainable" and hence, purely
"hypothetical." 219 Instead, these justices favored the use of state
and local community standards. It was neither "realistic nor constitutionally sound," explained Chief Justice Burger, "to require the
people of Maine or Mississippi to accept the norms and attitudes of
people living in Las Vegas or New York City." 2 20 Unfortunately, the
standards would be any
justices were silent as to why state or local
22 1
more "ascertainable" than a national one.
This view, appearing to be an unwitting venture into what Nixon
called the "New Federalism," 222 also raises an important constitutional problem. If one accepts the wisdom of Chief Justice Burger's
view regarding differences between attitudes in Mississippi and New
York City, then it follows that the reach of the first amendment will
21" According to Robert Rosenblum, a national standard was used in most lower federal

courts and in half of those states which identified some geographical area in statutes. See
Rosenblum, The Judicial Politics of Obscenity, 3 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1, 12-19 (1975). But see
Schagrue & Zeig, An Atlas for Obscenity: Exploring Community Standards, 7 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 157, 167-69 (1974) (some courts applied standards other than national standard for obscenity prior to Miller decision).
219 Miller, 413 U.S. at 30-31; Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974) (implying that
state community standards are also "hypothetical" and stating that juries need not be instructed
to apply standards of any particular community); cf. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 105
(1973) (national community standard is not required in cases involving federal obscenity statutes).
220 413 U.S. at 32.
221 The majority seems to assume that jurors are either representative of their community or
have some knowledge of community values. With respect to representatives, empirical studies
have consistently demonstrated that juries seldom reflect a cross-section of any community. See
Alker, Jury Selection as a Biased Social Process, 14 LAW & Soc'y REV. 9 (1976). On the subject
of ascertaining community standards, satirist Russell Baker has said it best:
Community standards of obscenity . . .are most nearly expressed by what television audiences will still sit for. This is because the community does not go to
movies anymore, nor read books. The people at the movies and those with books in
their laps are not the community. They are oddballs. The community is watching
television.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1973, § 6 (Magazine), at 6; cf. Comment, supra note 217, at 360 (arguing
that state and local standards are not ascertainable). See generally Note, Community Standards,
Class Actions, and Obscenity Under Miller v. California, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1843 n.39
(1975) (providing list of some of "contemporary community standards" utilized by various
courts); see also Leventhal, The 1973 Round of Obscenity-PornographyDecisions, 59 A.B.A.J.
1261, 1263 (1973) (posing question of whether "a college bookstore is to be governed by the
standards of the college community or of the town or county in which the college is located").
222 In hisState of the Union message before Congress, President Nixon characterized the
"New Federalism" as a return to a "grass-roots" type of government, whereby power from
Washington was to be given back to state and local government. N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1970, at
22, Col. 2.
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be greater in the latter than in the former. What may be declared
obscene in Mississippi and beyond the reach of the first amendment
may be found non-obscene and constitutionally protected in New
York City.2 2 3 Given the number of states and local communities in
the nation, it strains credibility to think that the adoption of a provincial approach to community standards is likely to bring greater certainty to the law on obscenity.
While.Miller presented the new obscenity test, the decision in
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton 224 provided the rationale for the
Court's new restrictive policy. Writing for the same five justice majority, the Chief Justice "categorically" rejected the view that material
could acquire constitutional protection by limiting the intended audience to consenting adults. 2 25 By so doing, the justices refused to
.accept the limited state interest theory articulated by Justice
Marshall in the Stanley case. 226 Quoting freely from the early opinions of Justice Brennan and Chief Justice Warren, the majority'maintained that "there are legitimate state interests at stake in stemming
the tide of commercialized obscenity, even assuming it is feasible to
enforce effective safeguards against exposure to juveniles and to the
passerby." 227
One such "interest" or policy objective identified by the justices
was "the social interest in order and morality." 228 Obscene expression may be regulated, explained the Chief Justice, because it is a

22' See, e.g., Roth, 354 U.S. at 503-08 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(arguing against uniform regulation of obscenity for all states); United States v. Various Articles
of Obscene Merchandise, 433 F. Supp. 1132, 1136 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd on other grounds,
562 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1977) (national community standard may not be applied, even if federal
statute is involved); Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 200-01 (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (national community standard is not attainable).
224 413 U.S. 49 (1973).

225 Id. at 57. In Slaton, the petitioners were the owners and managers of adult movie
theatres who sought affirmatively to limit their audiences to consenting adults. The posted signs
saying "Atlanta's Finest Mature Feature Films," "Adult Theatre-You must be 21 and able to
prove it," and "If viewing the nude body offends you, Please Do Not Enter." The trial court
held that the consenting adults only policy was permitted under the Court's policy in Stanley.
Relying on Reidel, the Supreme Court reversed, saying that the films in question constituted
hard-core pornography which was not protected by the Constitution. Id. at 52--53.
226 In Stanley, Justice Marshall said that a state may regulate obscenity in the interest of
protecting minors and unwilling adults from having to confront it, but that it may not ban
obscene material solely on the ground that it might lead to antisocial conduct. 394 U.S. at 567.
227 413 U.S. at 57-58. For a general overview of the legislative purposes for obscenity regulation, see Comment, 49 WASH. L. REV. 89, 118 (1973). But see Comment, supra note 217, at 36
(reviewing arguments against obscenity regulation which were put forth in Miller dissenting
opinions).
228 413 U.S. at 61 (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 485).
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form of "moral pollution" which undermines the good health of the
22 9
society as a whole.
However, the governmental interest in controlling the commercial distribution of obscenity encompasses more than the promotion of
what has been called the "public morality." 23 0 In language strikingly
similar to that used by Lord Justice Cockburn in the nineteenth century Hicklin case, Chief Justice Burger argued that government has a
legitimate interest not only in protecting the collective community
but also in protecting individuals from the consequences of their own
free will. In his view, the state may act "to protect the weak, the
uninformed, the unsuspecting, and the gullible fom the exercise of
their own volition." 23 1 In addition to having a "corrupting and debasing" effect on an individual's personality, the Chief Justice maintained that government may act on the assumption that exposure to
"obscene" materials may have a "tendency" to produce antisocial
be232
havior.
The resurrection of the "bad tendency" test represented the response of the Burger Court to the empirical studies conducted by the
President's Commission on Obscenity and Pornography. 233 One of
the specific objectives of this advisory body, created by Congress during the Johnson Administration, was "to study the effect of obscenity
and pornography upon the public . . . and its relationship to crime
and other anti-social behavior." 234 The findings of the Commission,
however, were markedly at variance with the Court's stated view.
Relying on both survey research and aggregate data,2 35 the Commis229 413 U.S. at 62-64. This argument was made by former Chief Justice Warren inJacobellis,
where he maintained that it was an obligation of government "to maintain a decent Society."
378 U.S. at 199 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
230 See H. CLOR, OBSCENITY AND PUBLIC MORALITY (1969); Kristol, Pornography, Obscenity and the Case for Censorship, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1971, § 6 (Magazine), at 25-26, 112-16.
For a systematic treatment of the effects of obscenity on political authority, see Paletz & Harris,
Four Letter Threats to Authority, 37 J. POL. 955-79 (1975).
231 413 U.S. at 64.
232 Id. at 61-64. The "bad tendency" test was used in the 1920's to punish subversive activities. It was a restrictive variation on the "clear and present danger" test which required
proof of causality between speech and illegal action. Under the "bad tendency" test, however,
expression could be regulated without a demonstration of causality. Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652, 667 (1924). In Paris, Chief Justice Burger remarked that, even absent "conclusive
proof of a connection between antisocial behavior and obscene material" legislatures may formulate rational policies based on "various unprovable assumptions." 413 U.S. at 60-61.
233 For a summary of a number of these empirical studies, see 29 J. SoC. ISSUES 1 (1973).

1 (1970).
235 The' Commission used the following procedures in studying the effects of sexual material:
"(1) surveys employing national probability samples of adults and minors; (2) 'quasiexperimental' studies of selected population groupings; (3) controlled experimental studies; (4)
studies of rates and incidence of various sex offenses and illegitimacy at the national level." THE
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 23 (1970).
234 THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY
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sion had concluded that exposure to obscene material had no adverse
effect upon the sexual behavior or attitudes of individuals toward
2 36
morality, and furthermore, did not lead to antisocial behavior.
With respect to individual attitudes, for example, the Commission
made the following determinations: "Exposure to erotic stimuli appears to have little or no effect upon already established attitudinal
commitments regarding either sexuality or sexual morality ....
The
overall picture is almost completely a tableau of no significant
2 37
change. "
A similar conclusion was reached about the causal relationship
which the Burger Court seemed to assume existed between exposure
to obscene stimuli and criminal or antisocial behavior. According to
the Commission: "Research to date thus provides no substantial basis
for the belief that erotic materials constitute a primary or significant
cause of the development of character deficits or that they operate as
a significant determinative factor in causing crime and delinquency." 238
Yet, the Commission had been careful not to overstate this position. It recognized the difficulty in applying conclusions based on
aggregate data to the behavior of specific individuals. Thus, while it
could state with some certainty that there was no conclusive relationship between exposure to erotic material and antisocial behavior, the
Commission had to concede that "it is obviously not possible, and
never would be possible, to state that never on any occasion, under
any conditions, did any erotic material ever contribute in any way to
the likelihood of any individual committing a sex crime." 239
Id. at 139.
If a case is to be made against 'pornography' in 1970, itwill have to be made on
grounds other than demonstrated effects of a damaging personal or social nature.
Empirical research designed to clarify the question has found no reliable evidence
to date that exposure to explicit sexual materials plays a significant role in the
causation of delinquent or criminal sexual behavior among youth or adults.
Id. But see id. at 383-424 (Hill-Link Minority Report). See also Comment, Community Standards and the Regulation of Obscenity, 24 DEPAUL L. REV. 185, 187 n.10 (1974) (Commission
reached "anticipated 'liberal' conclusion").
236

237 THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION

238

Id. at

ON

OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 26 (1970).

243.

239 Id.
The limitations of social science and the Commission's methodology are discussed
in Clor, Science, Eros and the Law: A Critique of the Obscenity Commission Report, 10
DUQ. L. REV. 63 (1971); Lockhart, The Findings and Recommendations of the Commission on
Obscenity and Pornography: Case Study in the Role of Social Science in Formulating Public
Policy, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 209 (1971); Wilson, Violence, Pornography, and Social Science, 22
PUB. INTEREST 45 (1971). A defense of the Commission's methodology may be found in
Johnson, The Pornography Report: Epistemology, Methodology and Ideology, 10 DUQ. L. REV.

190 (1971).

1978]

OBSCENITY LAW

While the five justice majority rejected the major conclusion and
findings of the Commission, it did embrace the disclaimer quoted
above along with the Commission's minority report.2 4 0 Citing the
minbrity report, favorable to the censorship of sexually oriented
material, 24 1 the Chief Justice maintained that it was constitutionally
permissible for the states to base anti-obscenity policies on unprovable assumptions.2 42 Ignoring the findings of some social scientists,
Chief Justice Burger argued that lawmakers could base public policy
on the "morally neutral judgment" that the commercial exhibition of
obscene material might have "a tendency to injure the community as
a whole, to endanger the public safety, or to jeopardize . . . the
States' 'right . . . to maintain a decent society."'243
The five justice majority also legitimized the use of unprovable
assumptions by the Congress. In United States v. Orito, 244 for example, the Court dismissed a claim of "privacy" and upheld the congressional use of the commerce clause to prohibit the transportation of
"obscene" material in non-public carriers. 2 45 Citing both Reidel
and
Thirty-Seven Photographs, the Chief Justice reiterated his view that
the right to possess "obscene" material in the privacy of the home did
not include a correlative right to transport or receive such material. 24 6 Nor does the claim of "privacy" extend to the importation of
sexually oriented material for purely personal use within the
home. 24 7 In the Court's view, to permit an individual personally to
bring "obscene" material into the United States from a foreign country would be similar to allowing the importation of narcotics for personal consumption. According to Chief Justice Burger, the national
government has a legitimate interest in prohibiting the use of both

240 413 U.S. at 58; see THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY
383-424 (Hill-Link Minority Report).
241 Cited are the writings of Alexander Bickel, Walter Berns, and Ernest van der Haag. 413
U.S. at 59 & n.2.
242 Id. at 60-63.
243 Id. at 69.

2- 413 U.S. 139 (1973).
245 Id. at 142-43.
246 Id. at 141-42; see United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 382 (1971)

(Black, J., dissenting); Hunsaker, The 1973 Obscenity-PornographyDecisions: Analysis, Impact,
and Legislative Alternatives, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 906, 911 (1974) (Onto Court, in effect,
overruled Stanley); cf. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of
the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 71 (1974) (Stanley was limited to its facts by
Slaton).
247 See 413 U.S. at 141-43; United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 128
(1972).
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interstate and foreign commerce for the transportation of any material
24 8
which might "harm" juveniles and the general public.
Finally, in Kaplan v. California,249 the use of unprovable. assumptions was defended with respect to the suppression of a plain-cot'ered
and unillustrated book containing descriptions of explicit sexual activities. 250 The Chief Justice argued that a state could "reasonably" conclude that such material had a tendency to encourage or
cause antisocial behavior and that it was not necessary to wait until
the social scientists demonstrated empirically that a cause and effect
relationship actually exists. 251 Moreover, in language again reminiscent of the repressive Hicklin case, Chief Justice Burger took judicial
notice of the continuing impact of widely circulated books and maintained that the kind of material involved in this had a tendency "to
25 3
reach [deprave and corrupt?] the impressionable young."
Although the Chief Justice was able to marshall majority support
for this new freedom restricting obscenity policy,2 5 3 he was less successful in eliminating the internal disagreements which had dominated Warren Court decision-making in this area. 2 54 Justices

248 413 U.S. at 57-58.
249 413 U.S. 115 (1973).
250 Id. at 116-17, 119-21. With respect to unprovable assumptions, see note 232 supra. On

this topic the Court observed:
The sum of experience, including that of the past two decades, affords an
ample basis for legislatures to conclude that a sensitive, key relationship of human
existence, central to family life, community welfare, and the development of human
personality, can be deposed and distorted by crass commercial exploitation of sex.
Nothing in the Constitution prohibits a State from reaching such a conclusion and
acting on it legislatively simply because there is no conclusive evidence or empicial
data.
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. at 63.
251 413 U.S. at 120. The Chief Justice declared in Slaton, that it was not up to the courts to
resolve "empirical uncertainties" underlying state legislation, except where the legislation
"plainly impinges upon" rights protected by the Constitution. Id. at 60. He concluded that the
legislature could "quite reasonably determine" the existence or non-existence of adverse effects
of obscene material on social relationships. Id. at 61. For a discussion of the role of unprovable
assumptions in other areas of state and federal regulations, see id. at 61-63. For a review by one
attorney and two behavioral scientists of the empirical evidence on the effects of psychosexual
stimuli, see Cairns, Paul & Wishner, Sex Censorship: The Assumptions of Anti-Obscenity Laws
and the Empirical Evidence, 46 MINN. L. REV. 1009 (1962).
252 413 U.S. 120; cf. THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY
383-412 (1970) (Hill-Link Minority Report) (indicating at least an arguable correlation between
obscene material and crime).
253 The Chief Justice was joined in the majority opinion by Justices White, Blackmun,
Powell, and Rehnquist. 413 U.S. at 115.
254 See, e.g., Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. at 476 (Black, J., dissenting), 493 (Harlan,
J., dissenting), 497 (Stewart, J., dissenting), 482 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Mishkin v. New York,
383 U.S. at 515 (Harlan, J., concurring), 515 (Black, J., dissenting), 518 (Stewart, J., dissenting);
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Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall dissented in all five
cases.2 5 5 Yet, among the dissenters in these cases, there was movement away from the seriatim approach of past years.2 5 6 Only two
alternative approaches were advocated: the reiteration of past policy
by Justice Douglas and the articulation of a new position by Justice
25 7
Brennan joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall.
With the departure of Hugo Black, William 0. Douglas now
stood alone in arguing for an "absolutist" interpretation of the first
amendment. In his view, the first amendment prevented the government from making any policy regulating the tastes, beliefs, and
ideas of the people:
The idea that the First Amendment permits punishment for ideas
that are "offensive" to the particular judge or jury sitting in judgment is astounding. . . . The First Amendment was not fashioned
as a vehicle for dispensing tranquilizers to the people. Its prime
function was to
keep debate open to "offensive" as well as to
"staid" people. 25 8
Thus, for Justice Douglas, "obscenity" was nothing more than the
expression of unorthodox or offensive ideas which ought not to be a
concern of any authoritative decision-making agency.
Recognizing, pel-haps, the lack of support for this position, Justice Douglas offered a proposal which seemed designed to bring some
certainty to the Court's "earnest and well intentioned" but doomed
attempt to define obscenity.2 59 His proposal involved the use of a
civil proceeding to determine "obscenity" prior to any criminal action. "If a specific book, play, paper, or motion picture has in a civil
proceeding been condemned as obscene and review of that finding
has been completed," explained Justice Douglas, "and thereafter a

Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. at 421 (Black & Stewart, JJ., concurring), 424 (Douglas, J.,
concurring), 441 (Clark, J., dissenting), 455 (Harlan,

J.,

dissenting), 460 (White, J., dissenting).

.5 See United States v. ONto, 413 U.S. at 145 (Douglas, J., dissenting), 147 (Brennan, J.,
joined by Stewart & Marshall, JJ., dissenting); United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413
U.S. 123, 130 (Douglas, J., dissenting), 138 (Brennan, J., joined by Stewart & Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting) (1973); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. at 122 (Douglas, J., separate opinion)
(Brennan, J., joined by Stewart & Marshall, JJ., dissenting); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. at 73 (Brennan, J., joined by Stewart & Marshall, JJ., dissenting), 70 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 37 (Douglas, J., dissenting), 47 (Brennan, J., joined by
Stewart & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
255 See note 255 supra.

2 See note 255 supra.
25s Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 44-45 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
259 As to the elusive nature of defining "'obscenity," see Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S.

at 476 (Black, J., dissenting).
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person publishes, shows, or displays that particular book or film, then
a vague law has been made specific . . . [and] would not violate the
time-honored void-for-vagueness test." 260
While there were no surprises in the Douglas position, Justice
Brennan, the author of most Warren Court obscenity policy, 26 1 announced in Miller that he had made "a substantial departure" 262 from
his previous viewpoints. 26 3 Although he continued to express the
belief that there is a class of expression which is obscene and not
entitled to constitutional protection, Justice Brennan maintained that
it was not possible to devise a precise test or definition of obscenity. 2 6 4 According to Justice Brennan, the inability to provide a satisfactory definition has produced several undesirable consequences: (1)
the failure "to provide adequate notice to persons who".create or disseminate sexually oriented materials; 26 5 (2) the suppression of marginal or "borderline" material which qualifies for first amendment
protection; 266 and (3) institutional difficulties including both the
Court's inability to end its continuing involvement with this policy
problem and the difficulties encountered by legislative and judicial
decision-making agencies in trying to comprehend and apply Supreme
Court guidelines. 267 "I am forced to conclude" explained Justice
Brennan, that the "concept of 'obscenity' cannot* be defined with sufficient specificity and clarity to provide fair notice or to prevent sub-

260 Miller v. California, 413 U.S.at 42-43; cf. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. at 478

(Black, J.,dissenting) (vagueness reason for opposition to Roth test).
265 Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966); Ginzburg v.

United States, 383 U.S. 463

(1966); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
262 413 U.S. at 48.
263 Compare Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. at 84 with Memoirs v. Massachusetts,
383 U.S. at 414-21"and Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. at 479-94.

26 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. at 84.
265 Id. at 86. Justice Brennan noted that the Court had repeatedly held that "the definition of
obscenity must provide adequate notice of exactly what is prohibited from dissemination." Id. at
85-86; see, e.g., Robe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313, 316 (1972); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v.
Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 690-91 (1968); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 578-80 (1948). With
regard to the standard formulated in the 1966 cases, Justice Black declared: "no person, not
even the most learned judge much less a layman, is capable of knowing in advance of an
ultimate decision in his particular case by this Court whether certain material comes within the
area of 'obscenity."' Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. at 480-81 (Black, J., dissenting).
266 413 U.S. at 88-89. The first amendment, Justice Brennan observed, requires a narrow
definition of obscenity in order to "minimize the interference with protected expression." Id. at

89. See generally United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971); Blount v.
Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971); The Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636 (1968); Freedman v.

Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964)
(plurality opinion).
267 413 U.S. at 91.
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stantial erosion of protected speech ... and to avoid very costly institutional harms." ' 2

68

Therefore, Justice Brennan abandoned his

own Roth-Alberts and Memoirs tests and rejected the new standard
articulated by the Burger Court. 26 9

All of these tests he deemed

270
unacceptable under the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine.
What Justice Brennan did support albeit belatedly, was the limited state interest policy advanced by Justice Marshall in Stanley. Justice Brennan explained his conversion to the Marshall view in the
following manner:

In short, while I cannot say that the interests of the States-apart

from the question of juveniles and unconsenting adults-are trivial
or nonexistent, I am compelled to conclude that these interests
cannot justify substantial damage to constitutional rights and to this
Nation's judicial machinery that inevitably results from state efforts
to bar the distribution even of unprotected material to consenting

adults ..

.

.I would hold, therefore, that at least in the absence of

distribution to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting
adults, the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the state

and federal governments from attempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly "obscene" con-

tents. 271
As Justice Brennan suggested, obtaining majority support for a
new test did not automatically resolve what Justice Harlan once called
"the intractable obscenity problem."

2 72

Major questions remained

regarding coverage, applicability, and implementation. With respect
to applying "contemporary community standards," for example, it was
not clear whether the justices had completely banned the use of a
"national" standard, required the use of "statewide" or "local" standards, or left the matter in the hands of the states. 273 Nor was it
clear which community should be used in deciding federal obscenity
cases. 274 Also left unanswered was the matter of whether judges and
268

id. at 103.

269 In Justice Brennan's'view, the majority view was not so much a new approach as it was a

"restatement" of Roth-Alberts: "Todav a majority of the Court offers a slightly altered form of
the basic Roth test, while leaving entirely unchanged the underlying approach.'" Id. at 83.
270 Id. at 83-84.
271 Id. at 112-13 (citations omitted).
272 See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. at 704 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
273 Compare Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. at 192-95 (Brennan, J., joined by Goldberg, J.)
(community standard national) with id. at 200-01 (Warrens C.J., joined by Clark, J., dissenting)
(community standard local) and Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 31-34 (Burger, C.J.,) (statewide
community standard).
274 See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 105-06 (1974); Hunsaker, supra note 246, at
422-33.
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juries should rely on their own judgments or rely on expert witnesses
in determining community standards.2 75 Questions remained with
respect to the applicability of the Miller standard to cases which had
begun prior to Miller but which were now on apeal. Finally, and
perhaps most important, was the unanswered question of proper implementation. Would the new obscenity test end the Supreme
Court's continual involvement with this policy problem and eliminate
the distasteful task of having to make independent judgments as to
whether material was or was not legally obscene?
In responding to these questions, the Miller majority continued
to advance its policy of extreme restrictiveness with respect to the
dissemination of sexually oriented material. In Hamling v. United
States, 276 for example, the justices sought to clarify their position on
contemporary community standards, the use of expert witnesses, and
the applicability of the new obscenity test to cases begun prior to
1973. Speaking for the majority, Justice Rehnquist allowed that the
defendants were entitled to receive any benefits afforded by the new
obscenity test. 2 77 However, it is not made clear how the Court's
freedom-restricting standard could offer protection not afforded by
the more permissive Memoirs formula. Yet, Justice Rehnquist went
through the motions of applying each of the Miller elements before
reaching the inevitable conclusion that the material in question, a
brochure advertising an illustrated version of the Presidential Report
on Obscenity and Pornography, could be found obscene under both
2 78
Miller and Memoirs.
Even the lack of specificity in the federal obscenity statute was
given judicial approval. 2 79 In what appeared to be a major retreat

275 On the subject of expert testimony, see Hunsaker, supra note 246, at 917; Note, The Use
of Expert Testimony in Obscenity Litigation, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 113.
276 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
277 Id. at 102. On this point, the Court said: "prior decisions establish a general rule that a
change in the law occurring after a relevant event in a case will be given effect while the case is
on direct review." Id.
278 418 U.S. at 110-24. The Miller and Memoirs tests for obscenity, however, differed significantly. Absent pandering, i.e., the commercial exploitation of erotic material solely for its
prurient appeal, the "social value" criteria of Memoirs allowed an appellate court to legitimize
the distribution of erotic material where it found a medium of social value. See Memoirs v.
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. at 420-21. Under the Miller standard, the input from the appellate
court on the question of obscenity was limited greatly. The Miller test permitted only the trier
of fact to determine the presence of any social value in the material under scrutiny by application of prevailing community standards. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 31-34.
279 The relevant statute provides:
Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile article, matter, thing,
device, or substance; and-
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from the second element of the Miller test, Justice Rehnquist maintained that general terminology could be construed as applying to the
specific examples of "hard core" sexual conduct that were listed in the
Miller decision but not included in the statute. 280 Thus, the majority
seemed to undermine that part of the Miller formula which was designed to counter charges of vagueness and failure to afford fair
28 1
notice.
The central issue in Hamling, however, was whether the Constitution requires the use of "national" community standards in federal obscenity cases. Relying on Warren Court policies, the district
judge had instructed the jury to use the "'community standards of the
nation as a whole"' and had prohibited the introduction of defense
evidence pertaining to "local" standards. 2 82 While Justice Rehnquist
conceded that the trial judge may have erred in requiring "national"
standards, he refused to accept Justice Brennan's dissenting view that
the refusal to permit the introduction of the evidence on "local" standards deprived the defendants of due process of law. From the majority perspective, the trial judge committed mere "harmless" error
which could not have "materially affected the deliberations of the
jury." 283

Justice Rehnquist spent considerable time trying to delineate the
"contemporary community standards" policy of the Miller majority.
He noted that the justices had not required the use of any particular
geographic area for determining community standards. What Miller
did establish, explained Justice Rehnquist, was that "[a] juror is entitled to draw on his own knowledge of the views of the average person
in the community or vicinage from which he comes for making the
required determination." 284 Expert testimony is not necessary; inEvery written or printed card, letter, circular, book, pamphlet, advertisement,
or notice of any kind giving information, directly or indirectly where, or how, or
from whom, or by what means any of such mentioned matters, articles, or things

may be obtained or made ....
18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976).
280 418 U.S. at 114.
281 For a proposal reducing the uncertainties in the Miller test while maintaining its
framework, see Lockhart, Escape from the Chill of Uncertainty: Explicit Sex and the First
Amendment, 9 GA. L. REV. 533, 557-87 (1975).
282 418 U.S. at 103.
283 Id. at 108.
284 Id. at 104. Several of the federal courts had advocated this local community standard prior
to Hamling. See, e.g., United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, 363 F. Supp.
165, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The First Circuit, however, has repeatedly decried the abandonment
of a "'national" standard at least in the context of federal prosecutions. See, e.g., United States v.
Palladino, 490 F.2d 499, 502-03 (1st Cir. 1974); United States v. One Reel of Film, 481 F.2d
206, 210-11 (1st Cir. 1973) (Coffin, C.J., concurring).
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deed, it may be excluded. 2 8 5 Under the Court's policy, therefore,
there is no uniform national standard for determining obscenity. As
Justice Brennan observed in his dissent, national distributors may
now have to contend wifh the community standards "of every hamlet
28 6
into which their goods may wander."
Although defendants being tried prior to Miller were entitled to
any benefits afforded by this policy, it seemed inconceivable that the
test would ever provide any real assistance. On first impression, this
2 87
appeared to be exactly what happened in Jenkins v. Georgia,
where the Burger Court unanimously overturned a convietion for the
exhibition of the critically acclaimed motion picture Carnal Knowledge. 288 Although Jenkins had originally been found guilty under a
state obscenity statute that had incorporated the Memoirs test, the
Georgia supreme court had affirmed the conviction on the basis of
Miller, arguing that "hard-core" pornography was not protected under
either Memoirs or Miller. 289 After viewing the film, the justices
were forced to conclude that "the film could not, as a matter of constitutional law, be found to depict conduct in a patently offensive
way, and that it is therefore not outside the protection of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments because it is obscene." 290 Thus, on
second look, it is apparent that this case did not really involve the
reaping of benefits under the Court's new policy; rather, it involved a
situation where both a local jury and the state's highest court were
unable to isolate "hard-core" pornography through the application of
either Miller or Memoirs.
Of course, the Burger Court was not about to abandon its policy
because the courts of one state were unable to understand it. In language curiously similar to Justice Brennan's in Roth, Justice
Rehnquist explained that "nudity alone is not enough to make material legally obscene." 291 More important, juries should not think
that they have "unbridled discretion" in determining patent offensiveness. As a check on jury discretion, Justice Rehnquist stated that
285 418 U.S. at
Pornographyand
286 418 U.S. at
Justices Marshall

104; see Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. at 56. See generally Bates,
the Expert Witness, 20 CIuM. Q. 250 (1978).
144-45 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan's dissent was supported by
and Stewart. Id. at 141. The utilization of varied local standards, and the

concomitant absence of a uniform national standard for determining obscenity, raises an acute

problem in the context of federal obscenity statutes. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 431 U.S.
241 (1977).
287 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
288

Id. at 161.

289 230 Ga. 726, 726-27, 199 S.E.2d 183, 184-85 (1973).

290 418 U.S. at 161.
291 Id.
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first amendment rights were to be protected by appellate review
where necessary.2 92
But Carnal Knowledge contained more than passing nudity. Justice Rehnquist conceded that the subject matter of this film was sexual and that it contained scenes in which "ultimate sexual acts" were
understood to be taking place. 29 3 While he declared that this film "is
simply not the 'public portrayal of hard core sexual conduct for its
own sake,'" 2 94 which was made punishable by Miller, there is no way
that the judges in Georgia could have known that this material was
not obscene under that test. 295 But one thing is clear in this case.
By reversing the decision of the Georgia courts, the Burger Court
provided convincing evidence that it had failed to resolve the "institutional" part of the obscenity problem: the Court had not been relieved of the time-consuming and distasteful task of making independent judgments on the question of obscenity. As Justice Brennan
noted in his concurring opinion, "it is clear that as long as the Miller
test remains in effect 'one cannot say with certainty that material is
obscene until at least five members of this Court, applying inevitably
obscure standards, have pronounced it so."'296
Many of the issues touched upon in Hainling and Jenkins were
raised again in several later cases. In Marks v. United States, 29 7 for
example, there was unanimity that the due process clause of the fifth
amendment precluded the retroactive application of Miller to the defendant's detriment-where the offense took place before and the
trial began after this decision. 298 However, four of the justices refused to go along with the Justice Powell led majority when it remanded the case for a new trial using the Memoirs test and any ben-

292 Id. at 160. This check on the fact finder lessened the importance of the jury's role as it
was envisaged in the Miller decision. See Schwed, Jenkins v. Georgia and Hamling v. United
States: Testing the Miller Obscenity Test, COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 349, 356 (1975).
293 418 U.S. at 161.
294

Id.

295 The limited importance of this decision was immediately recognized by Nathan Levin who

observed that "[tihe Court did nothing in the CarnalKnowledge case that was remotely promising. In fact it did nothing other than give Carnal Knowledge a free pass, good for that film
only." Levin, What's Happening to Free Speech, 14 THE NEW REPUBLIC 174 (July 27, Aug. 3,
1974).
29r418 U.S. at 164-65. Justice Brennan was again joined by Justices Marshall and Stewart,
Id. at 164. Justice Douglas filed a separate opinion in which he repeated his basic position that
"any ban on obscenity is prohibited by the First Amendment." Id. at 162.
297 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
298 Id. at 191-92; see Bowie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353-54 (1964) (due process
clause prohibits ex post facto application of judicial interpretations).

460
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efits afforded by Miller.299 Significantly, John Paul Stevens, the
newest Justice, seemed to agree with what Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stewart had been saying since Miller, i.e., that the Court's
constitutional standard and statutes incorporating this standard are so
unconstitutionally vague as to make "evenhanded enforcement of the
law . .. a virtual impossibility." 300 His major theme, however, was
that sexually oriented material, including "obscenity," has "value" and
is entitled to constitutional protection. "However distasteful these
materials are to some of us," stated Justice Stevens, "they are
nevertheless a form of communication and entertainment acceptable
to a substantial segment of society; otherwise, they would have no
value in the marketplace." 301 Finally, Justice Stevens questioned
the logic underlying the federal obscenity statute. Echoing what Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stewart had been saying for some time,
Justice Stevens said that he could not understand how an adult could
be prosecuted for distributing to others material that he had a con30 2
stitutional right to possess.
The problem of determining community standards in federal
30 3
obscenity cases was again considered in Smith v. United States.
Seeking to benefit from Iowa's policy of not proscribing the dissemination of obscenity to consenting adults, 30 4 the petitioner argued that
he should have been tried on the basis of "statewide" standards and
allowed to question members of the jury panel on voir dire with respect to their knowledge of community standards. 30 5 Speaking for
and
the Miller majority, Justice Blackmun rejected these contentions
3 06
statute.
obscenity
federal
the
of
validity
the
sustained
Although the petitioner argued in Smith that his intrastate mailing of the magazine Intrigue to consenting adults should have been
governed by state law and standards, the five justice majority concluded that state policies were not controlling in federal prosecutions.
Specifically, the Court held that the state's statute was "not conclusive with regard to the attitudes of the local community on obscen299 403 U.S. at 197-98. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall, dissented
in part. Id. While Justice Stevens wrote a separate opinion to the same effect, id., they all

would have simply reversed the conviction instead of remanding for a new trial. Id.
300 Id. at 198.
301 Id.
302 Id.; see Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.

at 564-66. Justice Stevens even questioned the

judicial ability to intelligently assess the jury's determination of relevant community standards.
430 U.S. at 198.
303 431 U.S. 291 (1977).
304 See IOWA CODE § 725 (1971). See also id. § 2804 (Cum. Supp. 1978) (making general

distribution of obscene material illegal) (effective Jan. 1, 1978).
305 431 U.S. at 298.
306 Id.

at 309.
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ity."307 Reaffirming what had been said in Hamling, Justice
Blackmun noted that "community standards" is a matter for jurors to
decide as factfinders, based on "their own understanding of the tolerance of the average person in their community." 308
In denying the states a major role in determining community
standards in federal obscenity cases, 30 9 the justices effectively limited
the potential impact of a permissive state obscenity policy. In Miller
and Slaton, the Chief Justice had spoken approvingly of "statewide"
standards and the right of the states to adopt a "laissez faire" policy. 3 10 But as Justice Blackmun now conceded, other than defining
the geographic area from which the jury is selected and legislating
juror instructions, there is little that a permissive state can do to effect community standards. 31 1
Although three separate opinions were submitted to this case,
only the dissent of Justice Stevens broke new ground. 3 12 In what
amounted to a further development of his position, Justice Stevens
declared that "criminal prosecutions are an unacceptable method of
abating a public nuisance which is entitled to at least a modicum of
First Amendment protection." 3 13 His disenchantment with criminal
prosecutions was based on his view that all federal criminal statutes
require the use of a uniform national standard, something which he
felt was unascertainable with respect to obscenity. Needless to say,
he felt that the Court's reliance on local standards only compounds
the problem by substituting anarchy for uniformity.
While Justice Stevens argued that the use of local standards is
inappropriate in criminal actions, he also argued that such "flexibility
Id. at 307.
308 Id. at 305. Indeed, both patent offensiveness and prurient interest are subject to jury
determination of community standards. Only the third element of the Miller test is not covered
by such standards. Thus, permissive states might have more of an impact if they concentrated
307

attention on the "serious" value element. See id.

'o9 The Court noted that while states may define "substantive limitations" or examples of
proscribed conduct depicted in obscene material, the standard for determining obscenity was
not one capable of being "defined legislatively." Id. at 303.
310 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. at 64; Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 31.
311 Justice Blackmun concluded by noting that "the State's right to abolish all regulation of
obscene material does not create a correlative right to force the Federal Government to allow
the mails or the channels of interstate or foreign commerce to be used for the purpose of
sending obscene material into the permissive State." 431 U.S. at 307.
312 Id. at 309. Justice Powell concurred and said that state laws are not controlling in federal
prosecutions unless there is congressional approval. Since he could find no congressional intent
to incorporate state obscenity statutes into federal law, he voted to affirm the conviction. Justice
Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall, dissented. For these justices, the federal
obscenity statute remains "clearly overbroad and unconstitutional on its face." Id. at 311
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
313 Id.
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is a desirable feature of a civil rule designed to protect the individual's right to select the kind of environment in which he wants to
live." 3 14 Under his approach, obscenity would not be treated as a
separate category of expression as under Roth and Miller. However,
all expression, including obscenity, might be subject to some governmental regulation if it produced a nuisance.3 15 There is no absolute constitutional right, explains Justice Stevens, to broadcast from
soundtrucks or to display erotic material in a residential area.3 16 In
the case at hand, however, Justice Stevens found no nuisance: the
material was sent to a consenting adult in a plain sealed envelope that
could not have offended any innocent third party in the community. 3 1 7

In addition to expounding on the meaning of contemporary
community standards, the Court was called upon to assess the degree of specificity required to satisfy the sexual conduct element of
the Miller test. 3 18 It was in Miller, that the Chief Justice had offered
a list of prohibited sexual conducts and declared that "no one will be
subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials
unless these materials depict or describe patently offensive 'hard core'
sexual conduct specifically defined by the regulating state law as written or construed." 319 Indeed, this statement had impressed some
observers as providing guidance to state legislatures and "fair notice"
to disseminators of sexually oriented expression. 3 20 In Ward v. Illinois, 321 however, the Miller majority all but abandoned its commitment to provide certainty through specificity when it upheld a conviction for the selling of sado-masochistic material under a state law

314
315
316

Id. at 317. Stevens credits former Chief Justice Warren for developing this policy. Id.
Id. at 318.
Id.

317 Id.

at 321. In the recently decided case of Pincus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293 (1978),

Chief Justice Burger displayed a rare permissive attitude when he declared that minors should
not be considered in determining whether material offends contemporary community standards.
According to Chief Justice Burger, a jury might "reach a lower 'average' when children are part
of the equation than they would if they restricted their consideration to the effect of allegedly
obscene materials on adults." Id. at 297. Justice Powell was the lone dissenter.
318 Citing Hamling's interpretation of the statute in question, the Smith Court declared that
the specificity requirement enunciated in Miller was satisfied since "the substantive conduct
encompassed by [the statute was] confined to 'the sort of "patently offensive representations of
the specific 'hard-core' sexual conduct given as examples in Miller v. California.""' 431 U.S. at
304.
319

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 27.

See, e.g., Note, Miller v. California: A Mandate for New Obscenity Legislation, 45 Miss.
L.J. 435 (1974).
320

321 431 U.S. 767 (1977).
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which continued to use the Roth definition and Memoirs test for determining obscenity after the change in Supreme Court policy.322
Since the Illinois statute contained no listing of prohibited sexual
conduct, 3 23 the majority was forced to look elsewhere for justifications
to sustain the law against charges of vagueness, overbreadth, and
noncompliance with the Miller specificity requirement. Much of what
was said in Justice White's majority opinion, however, seemed designed to test one's credulity. In finding that the statute was in compliance with current Supreme Court policy, for example, Justice
White noted that the state's highest court had judicially construed the
law as incorporating the first two elements of the Miller test prior to
Ward's appeal. 3 24 It did not matter that no mention was made at
this time regarding Chief Justice Burger's specific examples of prohibited conduct because there was nothing to indicate that the Illinois
supreme court "chose to create a fatal flaw in this statute." 3 25 This
view, explained Justice White, was supported by a later decision in
which all of the Miller examples were specifically incorporated into
the Illinois statute. 326 Yet, even this did not resolve the problem of
vagueness since "sado-masochism" was not one of the examples of
sexual conduct contained on Chief Justice Burger's list. 32 7 Responding to this point, the Court said that the Burger list was never meant
to be "exhaustive." 32 8 But if the list is not exhaustive, then obscenity remains an open-ended offense and the goal of specificity cannot
be attained.
What is most troublesome about the majority opinion, however,
is its assertion that the appellant had been given "fair notice" independently of the compliance with the Miller issue. Even if the Illinois
statute had not been construed as incorporating Miller, explained
Justice White, the appellant should have been aware that sadomasochistic materials had been declared obscene under the state's law
"long before Miller" and prior to the time of his prosecution.
322 Id. at 774-75.

323 The statute in question defines obscene as follows:
A thing is obscene if, considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to prurient
interest, that is, a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion, and if it
goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters. A thing is obscene even though the obscenity is latent, as in
the case of undeveloped photographs.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-20(b) (1973).
324 431 U.S. at 775.

325 Id.
326

Id.

327 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 25.
328 431 U.S. at 773. In fact, the Court relied on Mishkin for the proposition that the
sadomasochistic material in question was not protected by the first amendment. Id. at 773-74.
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Moreover, he should have known that similar material had been declared obscene in the Mishkin case.3 2 9 What the justices seem to be
saying, perhaps unintentionally, is that all material of a sadomasochistic nature should be viewed as being obscene or, at the very
least, potentially obscene. This seems to come dangerously close to
the premise which underlies the repressive "crime by analogy" con3 30
cept.
Among the dissents, the Stevens opinion is again the most important. 331 For the first time, Justice Stevens was joined by Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Stewart in calling for the de-criminalization of
obscenity. As the spokesman for the new minority coalition, Justice
Stevens offered the following argument and prediction:
One of the strongest arguments against regulating obscenity
through criminal law is the inherent vagueness of the obscenity
concept. The specificity requirement as described in Miller held
out the promise of a principled effort to respond to that argument.
By abandoning that effort today, the Court withdraws the cornerstone of the Miller structure and, undoubtedly, hastens its ul3 32
timate downfall.
III. Supplementation
In addition to establishing its own standard for determining
obscenity, the Burger Court has sought to further develop its antipornography policy by supplementing its basic definitional approach
with special "contexts" which permit the regulation of sexual expression that would otherwise be entitled to first amendment protection.
Such regulation had been found permissible when government sought
to achieve more important policy values. Occasionally, supplemental
policymaking took the form of reaffirming support for restrictive "contexts" identified by the Warren Court, e.g., pandering. For the most
part, however, the justices sought out new ways to prevent the dissemination of sexually oriented material. Specifically, the Court de329 Id. at 771; see Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. at 506-07.
330 The concept of crime by analogy originated under the Soviet criminal code prior to its
revision during Khrushchev's time. This theory made punishable, by analogy to express crimes,
those political acts that were not specifically prohibited by Soviet law. W.W. KULSKI, SOVIET
REGIME: COMMUNISM IN PRACTICE 158 (4th ed. 1963).
331 See id. at 777. Joined by Justice Stewart but not by Justice Marshall, Justice Brennan
dissented on the ground of overbroadness. Id. It is not yet clear whether Justice Marshall has
completely abandoned the Brennan view or whether he felt that Justice Stevens' dissent was
more compatible with his policy preferences in the particular case.
332 Id.

at 782.
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cided that a state's interest in regulating intoxicating beverages and a
city's interest in controlling the location of commercial property are
sufficiently important to justify the placing of incidental or minor constraints on sexual material. But when less substantial policy objectives
were involved or where more than an incidental burden was placed
on first amendment freedom, the justices were unwilling to permit
intrusions upon constitutionally protected expression.
1. Pandering. The Burger Court's position on pandering was set
forth in Splawn v. California.333 In this case, the Miller majority
went beyond the Ginzburg policy by holding that a jury could find a
seller of films guilty of obscenity based on the commercial exploitation of others involved in the distribution process. Writing for the
Court, Justice Rehnquist declared that there was "no doubt that as a
matter of First Amendment obscenity law, evidence of pandering to
prurient interests in the creation, promotion, or dissemination of
material is relevant in determining whether the material is
obscene." 334 While conceding that petitioner's offense occurred
prior to the inclusion of pandering into the California Penal Code,
Justice Rehnquist rejected the argument that this constituted a violation of the prohibition against ex post facto laws. In the Court's view,
the pandering section did not create any new substantive offense;
rather, it indicated what kinds of evidence might be considered by a
33
jury in determining obscenity. 5
In a dissent joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stewart,
Justice Stevens expressed the view that the majority opinion was inconsistent with recent decisions which had granted first amendment
protection to "truthful" statements made for a commercial purpose.
"Even if the social importance of the films themselves is dubious,"
explained Justice Stevens, "there is a definite social interest in permitting them to be accurately described. Only an accurate description
can enable a potential viewer to decide whether or not he wants to
see them." 336
333 431 U.S. 595 (1977).
334 Id. at 598.
335 Id. at 599-601.
Id. at 603-04. Justice Stevens also argued that the Court's decision on Virginia Pharmacy
Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), permitted the advertising of prescription drug
prices, overruled the Ginzburg decision. 431 U.S. at 603 n.2. Though joining the dissent, Justice Brennan did not agree with this interpretation. He said it was not necessary to go beyond
the determination that there was a violation against the prohibition against ex post facto laws.
Id. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall, also dissented on the ground of
overbroadness. Id. at 601 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart wrote a short dissenting
statement, indicating support for the positions of both Justices Brennan and Stevens. Id. at 602
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
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2. Alcoholic Beverage Control. In California v. LaRue, 33 7 a six
man majority, including all four Nixon appointees, held that the
twenty-first amendment 3 38 provided the states with sufficient authority to prohibit live sexual entertainment in establishments licensed to
sell liquor by the drink. 3 39 Speaking for the majority, Justice
Rehnquist stated that the regulation was not "irrational" and was consistent with the amendment which "has been recognized as conferring
something more than the normal state authority over public health,
welfare, and morals." 340 Thus, expression which could not be suppressed under the Miller test was now made subject to governmental
regulation via the twenty-first amendment.
This interpretation was vigorously challenged by dissenters
Brennan and Marshall. Justice Brennan argued that he could find nothing "in the language or history of the Twenty-first Amendment
[which] authorizes the States to use their liquor licensing power as a
means for the deliberate inhibition of protected, even if distasteful,
forms of expression." ' 3 4 1 Justice Marshall agreed with this analysis,
observing that "the framers of the Amendment would be astonished
to discover that they had inadvertently enacted a pro tanto repealer

of the rest of the Constitution."

342

3. Planning and Land Use. In Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc., 34 3 another five man majority upheld the constitutionality of Detroit zoning laws which sought to prevent the deterioration of
neighborhoods through limiting the concentration of "adult" motion
picture theaters and other "adult" establishments, e.g., bookstores,
and bars. Under the ordinances, no "adult" theater could be located
within 1,000 feet of any similar establishment or within 500 feet of a
residential area. A theater was classified as "adult" if it regularly
exhibited films which were "characterized by an emphasis" on sexual
34 4
matters.

337409 U.S. 109 (1972).
33s The twenty-first amendment of the Constitution provides in part: "The transportation or
importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use
therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." U.S.
CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.

339 409 U.S. at 114-15, 118-19. In this case, Justice Stewart joined the five man Miller
majority as well as submitting his own concurring opinion. See id. at 109.
340 id. at 114.
341 Id. at 123 (Brennen, J., dissenting).
34 Id.at 134-35 (Marshall, J.,dissenting). Justice Douglas also dissented, arguing that it was
premature to consider the constitutional issues. Id. at 122-23.
3- 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
34 Id. at 52-53, 72-73.
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Representing the views of the Chief Justice and Justices
Rehnquist, Powell, and White, Justice Stevens conceded that the
majority was supporting a content-based classification scheme which
placed limitations on material that would otherwise be granted constitutional protection. "The mere fact that the commercial exploitation
of material protected by the First Amendment is subject to zoning
and other licensing requirements," explained Justice Stevens, "is not
a sufficient reason for invalidating these ordinances." 345 For the
majority, "[t]he city's interest in planning and regulating the use of
property for commercial purposes" was more important than any incidental restrictions placed on sexual expression. 34 6 Furthermore,
the justices rejected the claim that the use of undefined words and
phrases rendered the ordinances unconstitutionally vague under the
3 47
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
One additional question was raised in this case. The system of
classifying theaters on the basis of film content had been challenged
on equal protection grounds. With the defection of Justice Powell,
there was no majority on this issue. 348 Speaking for the plurality,
Justice Stevens maintained that there had been no denial of equal
protection in that "the city's interest in the present and future character of neighborhoods adequately supports its classification of motion
pictures." 349 Thus, only a plurality of the justices were willing to
identify the preservation of the quality of urban life as the kind of
major policy objective which would warrant the regulation of all sexual expression. Justice Powell, on the other hand, argued that the
ordinance should be sustained as "an example of innovative land-use
regulation, implicating First Amendment concerns only incidentally
and to a limited extent." 350
The four dissenting justices all argued that the city's zoning
power had been used to place unconstitutional restraints on freedom.
Representing the dissenters, Justice Stewart argued that the majority
policy represented a "drastic departure from established principles of
First Amendment law" by legitimizing "a system of prior restraints
and criminal sanctions to enforce content-based restrictions on the
geographic location of motion pictures that exhibit nonobscene but
sexually oriented films." 3-1
345 Id. at 62.
346 Id. at 62-63.
347 Id. at 58-60.
348 Id. at 73.
349 Id. at 72.
350 Id. at 73.
351 Id. at 84.
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4. Nonconsenting Adults and Juveniles. It was not the intention
of the Burger Court, however, to sanction all intrusions upon constitutionally protected sexual material. In Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville,35 2 for example, the Court held that a city could not constitutionally make it a "public nuisance" for a drive-in movie theater
to show films containing nudity on a screen which was visible from a
public street. 3 53 Six of the justices, including Nixon appointees Powell and Blackmun, found the ordinance invalid on its face for dis35 4
criminating against motion pictures solely on the basis of content.
The justices rejected arguments that an ordinance which applies only
to movies containing nudity could be sustained as a means of protecting citizens against unwilling exposure to potentially offensive material, promoting traffic safety, or protecting the morals of minors.
"Where First Amendment freedoms are at stake," declared Justice
Powell for the majority, "we have repeatedly emphasized that precision of drafting and clarity of purpose are essential. These prerequisites are absent here."a55
The three dissenters took issue with the majority for its lack of
deference to state regulatory policies. In an opinion that was joined
by Justice Rehnquist, the Chief Justice argued that state government
has a legitimate interest in regulating nudity and that it was "not
unreasonable for lawmakers to believe that public nudity on a giant
screen . . . may have a tendency to divert attention from their task
and cause accidents." 35 6 Justice White thought that the issue was not
traffic safety but the rights of citizens who might be offended by public displays of nudity. In his dissent, he argued that government possesses sufficient authority to protect the sensibilities of these citi35 7
zens.
C. What the Justices Did: Changing Judicial Attitudes
Thus five years after its formulation, a majority of five justices
continue to provide support for a freedom restricting policy with respect to obscenity. Although it first appeared that the Miller majority
had gained an ally with President Ford's appointment of John Paul
Stevens, it appears that this justice has emerged as the leader of a

352

422 U.S. 205 (1975).

353 Id.

at 211-12.
354 Id. at 205, 211-12.
35 Id. at 217-18.
356 Id. at 218, 222.
357 Id. at 224.
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four man dissenting bloc which favors a generally perinissive attitude
toward the dissemination of sexually oriented material. Barring a
change in judicial personnel, this five-to-four division seems likely to
endure for some time, for as Justice Stevens has observed, "[t]here is
no reason to believe that the majority of the Court which decided
Miller . . . is any less adamant than the minority." 358
The extent of the Burger Court's commitment to regulate sexual
material is made evident in Table 9. While the Warren Court had
supported freedom of expression against governmental restraint in
more than eighty-five percent of the cases, 3 59 a majority of the justices
on the Burger Court have favored the individual in less than forty
percent of the cases.
Table 9 360
Support of Freedom of Expression by Burger
Court in Obscenity Cases
by Method of Disposition
Method of Disposition
Decision

Formal

Favoring Individual .....
Against Individual .......

Per Curiam

All Cases

18.7% (3)
81.3% (13)

85.7% (6)
14.3% (1)

39.1% (9)
60.9% (14)

Total ................... 100.0% (16)

100.0% (7)

100.0% (23)

Although there appears to be a significant difference in the behavior
of the justices when the cases are examined by method of disposition,
358 Liles

v. Oregon, 425 U.S. 963, 963 (1976).

359 See Table 4 in text supra.
30 Favoring Individual-Formal Disposition: Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977);

Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
Against Individual-Formal Disposition: Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767 (1977); Splawn v.
California, 431 U.S. 595 (1977); Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977); Young v. American Mini Theatres Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974);

United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973); United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S.
123 (1973); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S.
49 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972);
United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971); United States v. Reidel, 402
U.S. 351 (1971).
Favoring Individual-Per Curiam: Papish v. University of Missouri, 410 U.S. 667 (1973);
Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972); Hoyt v. Minnesota, 399 U.S. 524 (1970); Walker v.
Ohio, 398 U.S. 434 (1970); Bloss v. Dykema, 398 U.S. 278 (1970); Cain v. Kentucky, 397 U.S.

319 (1970). Against Individual-Per Curiam: Gable v. Jenkins, 397 U.S. 592 (1970).
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there is something misleading about the per curiam data. Only two of
these cases were decided with the participation of all four Nixon ap36 1
pointees.
Support for the regulation of sexual expression is also evident in
the extremely large number of instances where the Court has refused
to review convictions for obscenity. During the past four years, for
example, more than two dozen requests for writs of certiorari were
denied. 3 62 In virtually all of these cases, however, Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Stewart dissented, indicating that they would grant the
36 3
request for high court review and reverse the convictions.
The extent of the shift to a more restrictive obscenity policy is
apparent in the voting behavior of the individual justices. As can be
seen in Table 10, there is a significant difference in the support given
to sexual expression by the Nixon appointed justices and the holdovers from the Warren Court period.
Table 10364
Support of Freedom of Expression by Burger
Court Justices in Obscenity
Cases

Justice

Votes for
Individual

Thurgood Marshall .............
William Brennan ...............
Potter Stewart ..................
John Paul Stevens .............
Byron White ....................
Lewis Powell ....................
Harry Blackmun ................
William Rehnquist .............
Warren Burger .................

91.3% (21)
87.0% (20)
82.6% (19)
80.0% (4)
31.8% (7)
31.2% (5)
28.6% (6)
18.7% (3)
13.0% (3)

Votes for
Government
8.7%
13.0%
17.4%
20.0%
68.2%
68.7%
71.4%
81.2%
87.0%

(2)
(3)
(4)
(1)
(15)
(11)
(15)
(13)
(20)

361 See Papish v. University of Missouri, 410 U.S. 667 (1973); Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S.

229 (1972).
362 Christian v. United States, 432 U.S. 910 (1977); Harmer v. Motion Picture Film Entitled
"The Devil in Miss Jones", 430 U.S. 967 (1977); Taylor v. Tennessee, 430 U.S. 965 (1977);
American Theatre Corp. v. United States, 430 U.S. 938 (1977); Slepicoff v. United States, 425

U.S. 998 (1976); Matheny v. Alabama, 425 U.S. 982 (1976); Liles v.Oregon; 425 U.S. 963
(1976); Sanders v. Georgia, 424 U.S. 931 (1976); Danley v. United States, 424 U.S. 929 (1976);
McKinney v. Parsons, 423 U.S. 960 (1975); Kutler v. United States, 423 U.S. 959 (1975);
Sandquist v. California, 423 U.S. 900 (1975); Ratner v. United States, 423 U.S. 898 (1975);
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As expected, all of the Nixon appointees, Burger, Rehnquist,
Blackmun, and Powell were consistent supporters of obscenity regulafion. They received considerable support from Justice White, a holdover from the Warren Court period. Justice White's position represents a complete change in attitude as he has gone from being a supporter of individual liberty in more than 80% of the cases during the
Warren Court period to a defender of governmental regulation in more
than two-thirds of the Burger Court cases. 3 65 Clearly Justice White has
shifted from a generally liberal to a conservative position on obscenity. It is difficult to explain this change in voting behavior. Perhaps
Justice White has been influenced by the Chief Justice 366 or one of
the other Nixon appointees. 367 Or, maybe, he feels that the Nixon
appointees have returned to the spirit of Roth-Alberts. Justice White
always proclaimed support for the Court's original obscenity policy. 3 6 The other three holdovers from the Warren Court, namely,
Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall, continue their consistent
support for individual freedom. They have been joined in this position by Justice Stevens. This five-to-four breakdown favoring an antiobscenity policy contrasts sharply with the pattern which developed
on the Warren Court. On that Court, as noted above, five of the
justices supported individual liberty more than 90% of the time while
only one justice consistently supported governmental regulation.
There can be little doubt that the Burger Court has brought a
significant degree of consistency to the law of obscenity. The seriatim

Miller v. United States, 422 U.S. 1025 (1975); Miller v. United States,
Womack v. United States, 422 U.S. 1022 (1975); Carter v. United States,
Friedman v. United States, 421 U.S.1004 (1975); Ridens v. Illinois,
Dachesteiner v. United States, 421 U.S. 954 (1975); Dyke v. Georgia,

422
422
421
421

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

1024
1020
993
952

(1975);
(1975);
(1975);
(1975);

Adult Book Store v. M.E. Sensenbrenner, 421 U.S. 934 (1975); Atheneum Book Store, Inc. v.
City of Miami Beach, 420 U.S. 982 (1975); Herman v. Arkansas, 420 U.S. 953 (1975); Hill v.
United States, 420 U.S. 952 (1975); Harlow v. City of Birmingham, 420 U.S. 950 (1975);
McKinney v. City of Birmingham (I), 420 U.S. 950 (1975); McKinney v. City of Birmingham

(II), 420 U.S. 950 (1975); Pierce v. Alabama, 419 U.S. 1130 (1975); Ballew v. Alabama, 419 U.S.
1130 (1975); Pryba v. United States, 419 U.S. 1127 (1975).
363 See note 362 supra.
364 For the case providing the basis for this table, see note 142 supra.
365 Compare Table 5 supra and accompanying note with Table 10 supra and accompanying
note.
366 The role of the Chief Justice has been discussed by D. Danelski, The Influence of the
Chief Justice in the Decisional Process (Paper Delivered at the 1960 Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association).
367 The influencing of one justice by another through persuasion, bargaining, etc., is discussed in W. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964).

366 See, e.g.,

460-62 (White,

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 36-37; Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. at
dissenting); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. at 507.

J.,
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approach of the past has been replaced by two competing and almost
equally supported positions. Five of the Justices (Burger, Blackmun,
Powell, Rehnquist, White) support the Miller test for determining
obscenity. These justices have also been willing to permit the regulation of sexually oriented expression when more policy objectives have
been involved. In addition to protecting juveniles and nonconsenting
adults, these five justices believe that the maintenance of "public
morality" is one such important policy goal. In later cases, support
has been given to the goals of regulating intoxicating beverages and
the use of property for commercial purposes. Justice Stewart joined
the five man majority in the former, while Justice Blackmun defected
in the latter.
Four Justices (Brennan, Marshall, Stewart, Stevens) have supported an alternative view. They have argued that the crime of
obscenity cannot be defined with any precision and that statutes seeking to punish this offense are unconstitutional under the void-forvagueness doctrine. While they all favor the speedy demise of the
Miller policy, fundamental differences remain in their positions. Only
Justice Stevens, for example, has been willing to abandon completely
the logic which has traditionally placed obscenity in a separate category beyond the protection of the first amendment. With the possible
exception of Justice Marshall, the holdover justices from the Warren Court period continue to premise their policy positions on the
"two-tier" speech theory. This approach, however, permits little if
any governmental intrusion upon expression included in the protected category. An exception to this is the protection of juveniles
and nonconsenting adults. According to Justice Stevens' view, on the
other hand, all expression is considered to be protected by the first
amendment and subject to possible governmental regulation. He is
the only dissenter who desires to treat obscenity as a "nuisance" subject to civil proceedings and to permit the regulation of sexual expression when it occurs as a consequence of a city's attempt to plan the
location of commercial property through its zoning power. Finally,
Justice Brennan is alone in not wanting to overturn the "pandering"
policy which he formulated in the Ginzburg case.
SUMMARY

Despite widespread support for the protection of sexually
oriented material, the justices of the Warren Court were unable to
translate this policy goal into agreement upon a single standard for
determining obscenity. As the author of most Warren Court decisions
in this policy area, Justice William Brennan was, for more than
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twelve years, unable to mobilize majority support for his policy. The
Warren Court justices produced confusion instead of clarity in their
decisions. The confusion was evident in numerous split decisions, the
absence of a majority position in key cases, the proliferation of concurring and dissenting opinions, and the reliance on summary per
curiam judgments instead of formal written opinions. This internal
disagreement provided an environment which was to prove extremely
conducive for changing the Supreme Court's obscenity policy.
Former President Richard M. Nixon also played a significant role
in changing the Court's obscenity policy. He had promised to change
the ideological orientation of the high court through his power of appointment. While his selection of four "judicial conservatives" did not
have a major impact in most policy areas, it did have an important
effect on obscenity. After first succeeding in halting the development
of Warren Court policies, Chief Justice Burger led a five man majority in a reversal of past policy and the creation of a freedom restricting approach which was compatible with governmental attempts to
control obscenity. Clearly, Mr. Nixon understood what many behaviorally oriented students of the judiciary had been arguing for
some time, that personal policy preference was a major determinant
of judicial behavior in controversial policy areas. 36 9 Nixon had chosen well, for the new majority consisted of all four of his appointees
and holdover Justice Byron White. The other three Warren Court
holdovers joined with Ford appointee John Paul Stevens in presenting a generally unified alternative approach on obscenity. These justices demonstrated a strong commitment to provide constitutional
protection for most sexually oriented material. But this agreement has
come too late, for those favoring a relaxed attitude toward obscenity
no longer have the votes to implement their common policy objectives. Indeed, the Burger Court continues to be able to supplement
its basic anti-pornography approach with new regulatory policies.
"So long as I am in the White House," said Richard Nixon,
"there will be no relaxation of the national effort to control and eliminate smut from our national life."370 Mr. Nixon is no longer in the
White House, but his appointees remain. They are more than willing
to use their power to help achieve Mr. Nixon's policy objective.

369 Contemporary treatments on the role of judicial attitudes in the decisional process may be

found in G.

SCHUBERT,

THE JUDICIAL MIND REVISITED

(1974). See also D. RHODE & H.

(1976).
370 Paletz & Harris, 37 J.POL. 955 (1975) (quoting Wall St.
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